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Statement of Jurisdiction 
Appellee Mr. Shuster agrees with the brief of Applied Computer 
Techniques, Inc. (ACT) that this Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
from a final judgment of the Circuit Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(d)(1952, as amended). 
Statement of the Issues Presented for Review 
Appellee Mr. Shuster does not agree with ACT's statement of the 
issues in its brief.1 The issue set forth in ACT's Docketing Statement(s) 
was: 
"Whether or not the trial court properly interpreted Appellee's 
employment agreement." 
Appellee Shuster agrees with this statement of the issues on appeal and 
agrees that ACT preserved this issue for appeal. 
1
 ACT's brief contends that the issue is "whether or not Shuster was a 
commissioned salesman or worked for wages." (Br. 2) This reframing of the 
issue leads appellant ACT to argues one point (III) which was not disputed 
before the trial court and was not preserved for appeal. ACT also seeks the 
remedy of vacating the judgment for Shuster on all counts and granting 
summary judgment for ACT. This remedy is not available given ACT's prior 
failures to contest ACT's liability under the Utah Payment of Wages Act and to 
contest ACT's liability for attorneys fees. See infra. 
1 
Standard or Review 
Appellee Shuster agrees with ACT's statement of the standard of 
review. This Court should review for correctness the trial court's 
conclusions of law regarding the unambiguous nature of and the meaning 
of the contract, since there were no issues of material fact in dispute. Alf 
v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah, 1993). 
Statutory Provisions 
The following statutes and regulations are important to portions of 
this appeal, and they are set forth in Addendum A: 
Utah Attorney's Fees for Suits for Wages, Utah Code Ann. § 34-
27-1 
Utah Payment of Wages Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-1, § 34-28-2 and § 34-28-5 
Utah Minimum Wage Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-40-101 - 103 and § 34-40-104(1)(a) 
United States Fair Labor Standards Act, 
29 U.S.C.A. § 206(a)(1) and §213(a)(1) 
29 C.F.R. § 541.5(a) 
Utah Administrative Code R572-1-3 
Statement of the Case 
Nature of the Case 
The case concerns the interpretation of an Employment Agreement 
2 
(R 8-13; Addendum B) between ACT (the employer) and Mr. Shuster (the 
employee). The sole question on appeal is whether this contract required 
ACT to pay Mr. Shuster $750 for his final two weeks of work for ACT. 
Course of the Proceedings 
Appellee Shuster accepts ACT's Statement regarding the Course 
of Proceedings except to augment it as follows: 
Proceedings Before the Trial Court 
Shuster's Motion for Summary Judgment (R 62-64) relied only 
upon the Complaint (with attachments, including the contract) (R 1-17; 
Addendum B) and the Answer.(R 20-22; Add. C) Shuster's Memorandum 
(R 65-76 Add. D) set forth undisputed material facts relying upon these 
pleadings alone; Defendant ACT did not identify any of these facts as 
disputed. (R 91-96 ACT's Response; Add. E) Shuster contended in the 
trial court that there were no issues of material fact in dispute; and 
defendant ACT did not disagree.2 (R 108-116 Reply Memorandum Add. G) 
ACT's Motion for Summary Judgment (R 105-106) was supported 
by the Affidavit of ACT's President (R 97-98; Add. F). It was filed 
2
 Rule 4-501 (2)(b) of the Code of Judicial Administration provides: "All 
material facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly supported by 
an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose 
of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's 
statement." 
3 
together with ACT's Response (R 91-96; Add. E) which argued for 
Summary Judgment for ACT and which contained various statements of 
fact that Shuster disputed. Shuster submitted his Affidavit (R 117-121; 
Add. H) disputing these facts as well as the Memorandum specifically 
controverting the "facts" he disputed. (R 108-116; Add. G) 
Based upon these pleadings and after oral argument, the Circuit 
Court denied ACT's Motion for Summary Judgment and granted Mr. 
Shuster's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R 141-142, Memorandum 
Decision; Add. J) 
Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals 
After ACT filed its Docketing Statement with this Court, Appellee 
Shuster filed a Motion for Summary Disposition, Dismissal and Sanctions. 
This Court denied the Motions for Summary Disposition or Dismissal. This 
Court ordered that ruling on the other issues (sanctions) be deferred until 
plenary presentation and consideration. (Order August 8, 1994) 
Statement of Facts 
Appellee Shuster does not agree with the Statement of Facts set 
forth in ACT's brief. The trial court relied upon Shuster's undisputed 
Statement of Material Facts and upon the pleadings (the Complaint, the 
admitted documents attached thereto-including the contract--and the 
Answer), and the Circuit Court made the following Findings of Fact. 
4 
Appellee Shuster presents the trial court's Findings of Fact to this Court 
as a proper and undisputed Statement of Facts on appeal: 
1. The parties entered into a valid contract for employment on or 
about February 26, 1992, a copy of which is attached to the 
Complaint as Exhibit A. 
2. From February 26, 1992 to October 14, 1992 the plaintiff Mr. 
Shuster worked for the defendant ACT, "devoting all his time and 
energy during normal business hours" to ACT's business. 
3. From February 26, 1992 to September 30, 1992, ACT paid Mr. 
Shuster the "gross pay" provided for under Paragraph 6 of the 
Employment Agreement, since the commissions earned never 
exceeded such "gross pay." 
4. The employment relationship ended on October 15, 1992. At 
that time Mr. Shuster made written demand to ACT for payment of 
wages for his work from October 1, 1992 through October 14, 
1992. 
5. On October 19, 1992 ACT wrote Mr. Shuster and refused to 
pay any wages whatsoever for this two-week period, on the 
grounds that "no commissions were earned" during that period. 
ACT paid no wages at all at that time for that two-week period of 
work. 
5 
6. On November 19, 1992, Mr. Shuster again wrote and 
demanded the "gross pay" of $750 provided for in the Employment 
Agreement. Mr. Shuster further informed ACT that its failure to 
pay him any amount whatsoever not only violated the Agreement 
but violated state and federal minimum wage law. 
7. On or about December 1, 1992 ACT paid Mr. Shuster gross pay 
of $340, representing minimum wage for 80 hours of work; but 
again failed and refused to pay the full gross pay totalling $750 as 
demanded in accordance with the Employment Agreement. 
(R 148-151 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; Addendum K) 
Summary of Arguments 
The contract between the employer ACT and its employee Mr. 
Shuster is unambiguous and required ACT to pay Mr. Shuster "gross pay" 
of $750 for his final two weeks of full-time work for ACT. 
ACT's argument that Mr. Shuster was paid "commissions" and not 
"wages" is wrong and improperly raised for the first time on appeal. 
If this Court affirms the judgment for appellee Shuster, this Court 
should remand the case for calculation of attorneys' fees for legal work 
on appeal. 
This Court should sanction appellant ACT for its failure to comply 
with Appellate Rules of Procedure; its improper and erroneous statements 
6 
of facts (both here and in the Docketing Statement); and its attempt to 
raise issues in its brief which have not been preserved for appeal. 
Argument 
I. THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT UNAMBIGUOUSLY REQUIRED ACT 
TO PAY MR. SHUSTER GROSS PAY OF $750 FOR HIS FINAL TWO 
WEEKS OF WORK. 
The Employment Agreement itself is admitted to by both parties. 
The only issue is the interpretation of this employment contract. 
A. This Contract Should be Interpreted According to its Plain 
Meaning. 
The interpretation of the Employment Agreement is a matter of law. 
Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P. 2d 581, 582 
(Utah, 1988). Whether this contract is ambiguous and requires parol 
evidence to understand is itself a question of law. Faulkner v. 
Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah, 1983). The Circuit Court was 
correct in finding that this contract is not ambiguous. 
The terms of this contract should be interpreted "according to their 
plain and ordinary meaning." Equitable Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross, 
849 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah. App., 1993) cert, denied 860 P.2d 943 
7 
(Utah, 1993). The plain and ordinary meaning of this contract is that the 
plaintiff was entitled to the "gross pay" of $750 for his final two weeks 
of work. 
B. The Contract Unambiguously Required ACT to Pay Mr. Shuster 
$750 Each Pay Day. 
Paragraph 5 of the Agreement states that the Employer wil l pay the 
employee "a commission" for "all services." (R 9-10; in Addendum B) 
Paragraphs 5A - 5D set forth a complicated structure for calculating when 
"commissions" are due and how to calculate them. Paragraph 5D even 
provides that the employee will be paid commissions after his 
employment ends if a sale is made during the 30 days following his 
termination which was "attributable" to his efforts. (R 10) 
Paragraph 6 (R 10) sets forth provisions for paying a "draw against 
future commissions." It states (emphasis added): 
6. DRAW: Employee will be paid a draw against future 
commissions according to the following schedule: 
Davs Following Employment Draw 
1 through 60 days $2,800 per month 
61 through 90 days $2,200 per month 
91 days on $1,500 per month 
From "91 days on" the draw amount is $1500 per month or $750 every 
pay period. Paragraph 6 further provides: 
8 
"If commissions earned do not equal the draw per month as 
outlined above, Employer shall add that amount necessary to cause 
Employee's gross pay to equal the monthly amount shown, such 
amount to be considered a draw against future commissions." (R 
10 Employment Agreement 1 6. Emphasis added.) 
There is no contingency or ambiguity regarding the Employer's 
obligation to pay the employee, at a minimum, this gross pay each pay 
period. While the Employer can recapture the "draw" in certain 
circumstances, the Agreement never permits the employer to pay the 
employee less that the "gross pay" defined in Paragraph 6. There is no 
suggestion that an employee might arrive at pay-day and find that he gets 
$0 dollars in his envelope. There is, no where, any mention of paying an 
employee minimum wage for some particular two weeks of work. 
Moreover, this contract is not ambiguous. This is an integral 
contract. All the provisions regarding wages-commissions, draw, gross 
pay, and recapture of draw from commissions-are consistent with one 
another. While no provisions exist for paying less than the minimum 
"gross pay," the contract does provide for the Employer to recapture 
"draw" in particular circumstances. When commissions earned rise 
above a certain level ($2500 per month) and a "draw balance" exists, any 
commissions over $2500 will go to the Employer to pay off the 
"outstanding draws." (R 10-11 Employment Agreement ^6) After 
9 
termination, the Employer is required to pay commissions for 30 days. 
However, if there are "any outstanding draws", they will be paid off in 
total by any post-termination "commissions" before the ex-employee gets 
any commission earned during the 30 days following termination. (R 10 
Employment Agreement t5.D; Addendum B) In fact, the contract 
obviously labels all pay as either "commissions" or "draw against future 
commissions" to facilitate the recapture of the maximum total "draw" 
amount when sales are made and commissions earned. 
None of these provisions for paying back "draw" out of 
"commissions" earned suggests any ambiguity in the employer's 
obligation to pay the "gross pay" provided for in Paragraph 6 each and 
every pay day. 
C. Undisputed Facts and Law are Consistent with the 
Interpretation that ACT Owed Mr. Shuster Gross Pay of $750. 
During the entire term of employment (except for the last pay day), 
ACT behaved consistently with this plain meaning of the contract. Each 
pay day for seven months ACT paid Mr. Shuster the "gross pay" amount. 
(R 149 Findings 1 3, in Addendum K) 
However, on Mr. Shuster's final pay day, ACT's ignored the "gross 
pay" provision and paid Mr. Shuster no wages whatsoever since he had 
not closed any sales during his final two weeks of full-time labor for ACT. 
10 
(R 3 Complaint 1 10, R 15 Complaint Exhibit C; in Addendum B. R 20 
Answer *[ 3; in Addendum C). ACT argues that this is sensible for the 
final pay period. But this interpretation is unconscionable. It would make 
the wages owed an employee entirely dependent upon the date when 
employment ended. If the employee resigned the day after "pay day," he 
would have received the "gross pay" and he would have been fully 
compensated. If, as in this case, the employment terminated the day the 
pay period ended, the employer might obtain two weeks of free labor. 
Surely a contract cannot set up such a "lottery" for wages. Since this 
employment contract could be terminated with no notice (R 12 
Agreement 1 1 3 ; Add. B), there must be a fixed wage owed no matter 
which day in the month the employment ends. 
ACT's initial position (that the contract required no payment of any 
wages to Mr. Shuster) was also illegal. If an employee works full-time, for 
two weeks, at his employer's offices under his employer's direction the 
employer must pay him at least minimum wage. Both the federal Fair 
Labor Standards Act, the Utah Minimum Wage Act and related 
regulations require employers to pay their employees at least minimum 
wage for their work. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 206; Utah Code Ann. § 34-40-
101 et. seq.; and U.C.A. R572-1-3. See also Pierce v. Anagnostakis, 
394 P.2d 74, 75-76 (Utah, 1964) (Even though waitress agreed to work 
11 
for "tips" only she was entitled to minimum wage under Utah statute). 
There is an exception to minimum wage law for "outside sales persons" 
which is irrelevant to this case.3 This exception makes common sense, 
as the employer will not be able to oversee an "outside sales person," 
and will not be certain how many hours he devotes to the employer's 
business. However, Mr. Shuster was not an "outside sales person" but 
was contractually obligated to "devote all his time and efforts during 
normal business hours of Employer to the performance and duties on 
behalf of Employer." (R 8 Agreement 1 4; Add. B) And he did so. (R 149 
Findings \ 2; Add. K). He worked at ACT's offices and called customers 
by telephone, demonstrated products by modem, mailed solicitations and 
developed marketing plans, all at ACT's business office. (R 118-121 
Shuster Affidavit 1 6-9, 12; Add. H). For such work for ACT, at ACT's 
offices, ACT was required to pay Mr. Shuster at least minimum wage. 
In Mr. Shuster's second written demand for payment, he referenced 
minimum wage law. (R 16 Complaint Exhibit D; Add. B). After that, ACT 
sent him minimum wage. (R 3 Complaint 111 & 12 and R 17 Complaint 
3
 The exception to minimum wage law for "outside sales persons" is 
irrelevant to this case as it was contractually required and factually undisputed 
that Mr. Shuster worked full-time at ACT's place of business. Since he was not 
"customarily and regularly engaged away from his employer's place or places 
of business" he was, under minimum wage law, an "inside salesman." 29 
C.F.R. § 541.5(a). See 29 U.S.C.A. § 213 and Utah Code Ann. § 34-40-104. 
12 
Exhibit E; Add. B. R 20 Answer S 3; Add. C). There is nothing 
whatsoever in the Employment Agreement regarding minimum wage. 
D. ACT's Arguments are Unpersuasive. 
ACT argues that it is illogical to pay a worker something called 
"pre-paid commissions" if he "no longer calls on potential customers, 
therefore, there is no way he can earn additional commissions." (Br. 10) 
ACT again ignores the plain language of the contract. For thirty days 
following termination the employee CAN EARN ADDITIONAL 
COMMISSIONS. (See R 10 Employment Agreement 1 5D; Add. B). 
There is nothing illogical about paying "draws against future 
commissions" to an employee who is leaving the job but yet might earn 
additional commissions during the 30 days after his termination. 
Even if the contract didn't have the provision for earning 
commissions after termination, it would be completely logical to interpret 
the provisions in Paragraph 6 for paying a set "gross pay" each month in 
a legal manner. 
Today ACT's other argument focuses upon a word count. ACT 
contends that the Agreement "uses the word 'commissions' 19 times, 
the words 'draw against future commissions' once and 'commissionable' 
6 times." (Br. 9). By force of numbers, all ACT had to pay Mr. Shuster 
was "commissions." 
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Word counts are not a respected way to interpret contracts.4 
Rather "it is axiomatic that a contract should be interpreted so as to 
harmonize all of its provisions and all of its terms, which terms should be 
given effect if it is possible to do so." LDS Hospital v. Capitol Life Ins. 
Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah, 1988). Here, when one reads all the 
words-including the provisions for paying "gross pay" in f 6-the 
contract is integral, unambiguous, and legal. 
Moreover, ACT's word-count argument that "commissions" were 
all that was owed would render the Employment Agreement patently 
illegal in failing to require even minimum wage. Presumably this Court 
should ignore that illegality. Presumably, this Court should enforce such 
an illegal contract since Mr. Shuster was, after all, finally paid minimum 
wage. 
This contract should not be considered ambiguous simply because 
the defendant "ascribes a different meaning to it to suit his or her own 
interests," Equitable Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross 849 P. 2d 1187, 
1192 (Utah. App., 1993) citing Larson v. Overland Thrift and Loan, 818 
P.2d 1316, 1319 (Utah App. 1991) cert, denied, 832 P.2d 476 (Utah, 
4
 Moreover, ACT fails to count all the words. ACT ignores entirely the 
words "gross pay" which are used one time, thus tying the usage rate of "draw 
against future commissions." R 10 5 6; in Addendum B. 
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1992). The only plain, sensible and legal interpretation of the contract 
that ACT drafted and Mr. Shuster signed is that Mr. Shuster is entitled 
to the "gross pay" amount (here $750) for his last two weeks in ACT's 
employ. 
II. ACT'S ARGUMENT THAT MR. SHUSTER WAS PAID 
"COMMISSIONS" AND NOT "WAGES" IS WRONG AND IMPROPER. 
In its Brief, and for the first time, ACT reframes the issue as 
"whether Mr. Shuster was a commissioned salesman or worked for 
wages." (Statement of Issues, Br. 2) For the first time ACT argues that 
statutes protecting wage earners do not apply to this case. (Br. 9, Point 
III) Hence, ACT argues, the trial court's order of a civil penalty for ACT's 
violation of the Utah Payment of Wages Act, and for payment of 
plaintiff's attorneys fees under the Attorneys' Fees in Suits for Wages 
Act should all be vacated; and this Court should "reverse the trial court's 
ruling that granted Shuster's motion for summary judgment and grant 
ACT's motion for summary judgment." (Br. 11) 
ACT's position that these laws do not apply to it is not only wrong, 
but frivolously wrong. ACT's attempt to raise this argument on appeal, 
having never made any such argument to the trial court, is improper and 
merits sanctions. 
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A. Whatever ACT Paid or Should Have Paid Mr. Shuster was 
"Wages" under Utah Law. 
While ACT can draft a contract that calls all payments 
"commissions" or "draws against future commissions," ACT's artful use 
of language does not bind legislative bodies. "Wages" is a term of art 
used in various laws to cover any and all payments made by "employers" 
to "employees" for their work. 
In the Utah Payment of Wages Act the Utah legislature set forth 
what it meant by the term "wages;" and "wages" explicitly includes 
"commission(s)": 
§ 34-28-2 Definitions. 
As used in this chapter:. . . . 
(2) The word "wages" means all amounts due the employee for 
labor or services, whether the amount is fixed or ascertained on a 
time, task, piece, commission basis or other method of calculating 
such amount, (emphasis added) 
Thus, by the terms of this statute, whatever ACT was obligated to pay 
Mr. Shuster-whether commissions or draw or minimum wage or gross 
pay-is "wages" and is covered by the Payment of Wages statute. 
It is worth noting that in various statutes the word "wages" is 
regularly used to refer to whatever an "employer" pays an "employee." 
Thus, the "Utah Minimum Wage Act" requires the payment of "minimum 
wage for all private and public employees" with certain specific 
16 
exemptions. Utah Code Ann. § 34-40-103(1 )(a) and §34-40-104. 
(emphasis added). The federal Fair Labor Standards Act section on 
"Minimum Wage" similarly requires that "every employer shall pay to 
each of his employees. . . wages at [particular] . . . rates" 29 U.S.C.A. 
§ 206. (emphasis added). Neither statute excludes "commissions" from 
the definition of wages.5 Similarly, the Utah law which makes wages a 
preferred debt defines "wages" to include "all amounts due an employee 
for labor or services, whether the amount is fixed or ascertained on a . . 
. commission basis." Utah Code Ann. § 34-26-4. 
The chapter of Utah law entitled Attorneys' Fees in Suits for Wages 
applies "whenever a . . . employee shall have cause to bring suit for 
wages earned and due according to the terms of his employment." Utah 
Code Ann. § 34-27-1 . This one-section chapter does not itself contain 
a definition of "wages." However, this chapter was enacted together 
with the preceding chapter (Wages a Preferred Debt § 34-26-1 et seq.) 
and the succeeding chapter (Payment of Wages Act § 34-28-1 et. seq.); 
and both of these chapters clearly define "wages" to include all payments 
5
 Both minimum wage statutes exempt employees who are "outside sales 
persons" Utah Code Ann. § 34-40-104(1)(a) or "outside salesman" 29 U.S.C.A. 
§ 2 1 3 from coverage. Although many outside sales persons are paid 
commissions, it does not logically follow that if an employee is paid a 
commission he is an outside sales person. 
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and specifically to include "commissions."6 (See above.) The only 
sensible way to read the Attorneys' Fees chapter is to understand it as 
providing a procedural remedy (attorney fees) for enforcing the rights to 
wages set forth in the Payment of Wages Act which follows immediately. 
And the one case on point, Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart Inc., 417 
P.2d 761 , 765 (Utah, 1966) holds that a salesman who brought suit to 
collect unpaid commissions was entitled to attorneys fees under the 
(predecessor) statute. 
B. The Utah Payment of Wages Act Applies to this Case 
The Utah Payment of Wages Act (UPWA) requires that an employer 
promptly pay an employee final wages after the employment relationship 
ends. Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5.7 "If the employer fails to do so upon 
the employee's written demand for payment, the employee's wages 
continue to accrue from the date of written demand until payment is 
made, but no longer than sixty days." Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467, 
6
 Utah Code Ann. § 34-26-4 which defines "wages" was enacted by L. 
1969 ch. 85 § 80; Utah Code Ann. § 34-27-1 regarding attorneys fees was 
enacted by L. 1969 ch. 85 § 8 1 ; and Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-2 which defines 
wages under the UPWA was enacted by L. 1969 ch. 85 § 83. 
7
 The time periods vary slightly depending upon whether the employer 
"separates" an employee from the payroll (24 hours) or the employee "resigns" 
(72 hours). In this case, these differences are irrelevant, since ACT failed to 
pay any wages for 45 days, violating the statute irrespective of which 
subsection applies. 
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469 (Utah, 1992)(dicta).8 
The statute provides that the "wages of the employee shall 
continue. . .at the same rate which the employee received at the time of 
separation." Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5(2) (emphasis added). The 
statutory word "shall" indicates that this is a mandatory penalty. Indeed, 
the trial court in Smith v. Batchelor saw this penalty as mandatory.9 
ACT's brief erroneously and improperly argues: 
"This section does not apply, however, to earnings of sales agents 
employed on a commission basis. See paragraph (b) if that section, 
(sic)" (Br. 9) 
It is true that this section does not apply to a commissioned sales 
agent "who has custody of accounts, money or goods of his principal if 
the net amount due the agent is determined only after an audit or 
verification of sales accounts, funds, or stocks." Utah Code Ann. § 34-
8
 In the trial court it was undisputed that ACT failed to pay any wages at 
all to Mr. Shuster for 45 days. (R 66-67 Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities Statement of Material Facts 1 8, relying upon R 5 Complaint 118 
admitted in R 21 Answer \ 5.) It was similarly undisputed that Mr. Shuster 
gave written demand for his wages on the day his employment ended, and that 
he filed this action within 60 days of that date. (R 66-67 Memorandum's 
Statement of Material Facts \ 8 and 10; in Addendum D ). 
9
 In Smith v. Batchelor, the trial court denied recovery under the federal Fair 
Labor Standard's Act given the recovery awarded under the UWPA. The 
Supreme Court reversed: "The trial court found. . . that equity prohibits both 
state and federal recovery for the same violation. This is incorrect. Equity 
follows the law. It cannot abridge an explicit statutory requirement." Smith v. 
Batchelor at 471. 
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28-5(1 )(b). But Mr. Shuster did not have custody of ACT's accounts, 
money or goods on the date his employment ended. And there was no 
audit needed to discover the commissions owed. In fact, the Complaint 
specifically plead these facts: 
1f 16. Defendant ACT has at all relevant times maintained and had 
custody of all sales records necessary to determine commissions 
and gross pay owed to Plaintiff Lee Shuster. 
1 1 7 . On October 15, 1992 Defendant ACT knew that no sales 
had occurred during the period from October 1 through October 14, 
1992 and thus knew that no commissions were owed to Plaintiff 
Lee Shuster at the t ime of separation from employment. (R 4-5 
Complaint; in Addendum B) 
And ACT's Answer specifically admitted to these facts: 
1 5. Admits the allegations contained in paragraph sixteen, 
seventeen and eighteen. (R 21 Answer; in Addendum C) 
ACT improperly cites the law by quoting only a portion of the 
statute. ACT improperly raises an argument which is not grounded in 
fact or law, given the Complaint and Answer fi led. 
C. Utah Statute Mandates Payment of Attorneys' Fees in this Case 
Utah statute provides for attorneys fees "whenever a . . . employee 
shall have cause to bring suit for wages earned and due according to the 
terms of his employment." Utah Code Ann. § 34 -27 -1 . If the court finds 
"that the amount for which he has brought suit is justly due" then: 
20 
"it shall be the duty of the court. . . to allow to the plaintiff a 
reasonable attorneys' fee in addition to the amount found due for 
wages, to be taxed as costs of suit." Utah Code Ann. § 34-27-1. 
(emphasis added) 
Here again, this statute uses mandatory, not discretionary language. An 
employee who prevails in a suit for wages must get attorneys' fees. 
ACT's use of the terms "commissions" and "draw against future 
commissions" does not make this law inapplicable. "Wages" as used in 
this act includes any payment-whether salary or commissions-an 
employer owes its employees. The case on point is Bennett v. 
Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc. 417 P.2d 761, 765 (Utah, 1966). In 
Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart Inc. a salesman was awarded 
attorneys' fees under this act for proving that he was entitled to be paid 
a certain amount in commissions. The Utah Supreme Court quoted the 
definitional language10 of the next section on wages and held: 
The fact that plaintiff was paid on a commission basis does not 
preclude him from coverage under this section. Bennett at 765. 
Not only do the plain words of the statutes establish that attorneys fees 
are mandated in this case, but the only authority on point definitively hold 
10
 "Wages shall mean all amounts at which the labor or service rendered is 
recompensed, whether the amount is fixed or ascertained on a time, task piece, 
commission basis or other methods of calculating such amount." Emphasis 
added by Court. Bennett at 765. quoting then Section 34-10-3(b), U.C.A. 
1953. 
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that when an employee is paid "commissions" those are nevertheless 
"wages" under the statute that allows him to collect attorneys fees when 
he has to sue to collect his wages. ACT's argument has no support. 
D. ACT's Argument that these Statutes Do Not Apply is Improper 
Since No Such Argument was Ever Presented to the Trial Court. 
ACT never previously raised any argument that either the Utah 
Payment of Wages Act or the Attorneys7 Fees statutory provisions do not 
apply. 
Mr. Shuster raised and briefed the issue of civil penalties under the 
UPWA in his Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in 
support. (R 70-72 Pt. II, p.6-8; in Addendum D) ACT did not say one 
word to contest this argument in its Response.(R 91-96; in Addendum E) 
In Shuster's Reply Memorandum he confirmed that the issue as to the 
penalty under the UPWA was undisputed: 
III. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR CIVIL PENALTIES UNDER THE UTAH 
PAYMENT OF WAGE ACT IS NOT DISPUTED. 
Plaintiff's second cause of action is based upon ACT's 
violation of the Utah Payment of Wages Act. The UPWA requires 
prompt payment of wages at termination. This cause of action 
does not depend upon the interpretation of the Employment 
Agreement.11 If ACT owed Mr. Shuster any wages at all (even 
"minimum wages") ACT violated the UPWA for paying nothing for 
11
 The amount of the civil penalty depends upon whether this Court finds 
the plaintiff entitled to wages under the Agreement or entitled to minimum 
wage. 
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45 days. 
Defendant ACT's Response and Memorandum does not 
controvert this point at all. Accordingly, this Court should order 
judgment for the Plaintiff under Count II for ACT's violation of the 
Utah Payment of Wage Act. 
(R 114-115 Reply Memorandum; in Addendum G) 
Even at oral argument ACT did not dispute the applicability of the 
UPWA to this case. (R 245-246; in Addendum D ACT did argue that its 
failure to pay Mr. Shuster anything at all for 45 days was not in "bad 
faith." (R 245-246; Add. I) In response, Mr. Shuster urged not only that 
the penalty was mandatory but that it was also equitable under all the 
circumstances.12 Finally, at the hearing Judge Fuchs indicated his view 
that the UPWA was mandatory and ACT's counsel seemed to concede 
that point. (R 260-261; Add. I) The only argument made-regarding "bad 
faith" and the reasonableness of penalties-does not hint at an argument 
that the UPWA does not apply in this case. 
Similarly, Shuster raised and briefed his entitlement to attorneys' 
fees under the act in his Motion (R 62-63) and Memorandum (R 72-76 Pt. 
12
 When Mr. Shuster notified ACT that its actions violated minimum wage 
law, he also informed ACT of the UPWA penalties and the Attorneys' Fees 
provisions. However, in his letter Mr. Shuster offered to settle the entire 
dispute ("to consider myself paid in full for all claims that could exist between 
us") if ACT paid the contractual wages of $750 even at that late date. (R 16 
Complaint Exhibit D; Add. B) Instead, ACT chose to send the minimum wage 
amount (R 19 Complaint Exhibit E; Add. B), and Mr. Shuster did what he 
promised in his letter-brought this action raising all available claims. 
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III.; Add. D) Again, ACT's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment never addresses the applicability of the Attorneys' Fees statute 
to this case. Nor did ACT raise any arguments as to attorneys' fees 
during oral argument. (R 261-262; Add. D Moreover, when the trial court 
entered its Memorandum Decision, Judge Fuchs specifically allowed ACT 
an opportunity to challenge the attorneys' fees: 
Plaintiff is awarded attorney fees as prayed for by the affidavit. 
Defendant shall have 10 days to challenge the attorney fees and 
request a hearing if appropriate. (R 141 -142 Memorandum Decision 
p.2; in Addendum J) 
ACT did not avail itself of the court's invitation to challenge attorneys' 
fees at that timely point. 
It is improper for ACT to raise and seek to dispute these legal 
issues before this appellate court, having never raised them in the trial 
court. "[I]t is axiomatic that matters not presented to the trial court may 
not be raised for the first time on appeal." Franklin Financial v. New 
Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah, 1983) 
(sufficiency of affidavit not challenged in trial court prior to summary 
judgment). See also Ong International (USA) v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 
P.2d 447, 455 (Utah, 1993) (jury instruction). Even constitutional 
challenges may not be presented on appeal if they were not "timely 
presented to the trial court in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling 
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thereon." Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah App. 
1989) (equal protection challenge to jury selection). See also Espinal v. 
Salt Lake City Board of Education, 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990) (Utah 
Constitution). "Issues not raised in the trial court in timely fashion are 
deemed waived, precluding [the Court of Appeals] from considering their 
merits on appeal." Salt Lake County v. Carlston at 655. (emphasis 
added). 
This Court has fully explained the rationale for such issue 
preclusion: "To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must 
timely bring the issue to the attention of the trial court, thus providing the 
court an opportunity to rule on the issue's merits." LeBaron & Assoc, v. 
Rebel Enterprises, 823 P.2d 479, 483 (Utah App. 1991)--issue of 
mitigation was not raised "to the level of consciousness . . . sufficient to 
allow the trial judge to consider it." Id. Even "obliquely" raising an issue 
in the complaint or answer is not sufficient to preserve it for appeal 
where the issue was not argued and the trial court was not asked to rule 
on the issue. Id. citing James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801-2 (Utah 
App. 1987) (issue of equitable mortgage "obliquely raised" in complaint, 
but trial court made no ruling and plaintiff did not object or provide legal 
authority on issue, thus not properly before Court on Appeal); and Turtle 
Management Inc. v. Haggis Management Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah, 
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1982) (issue of covenant not to compete's legality raised in answer, but 
"no argument was made to the district court on this issue" and trial court 
had no opportunity to make findings or rulings on issue, thus it was not 
properly before Utah Supreme Court on appeal.) 
Here ACT's arguments (that the Utah Payment of Wage Act and 
the Attorneys' Fees statute do not apply to this case) were never made, 
argued, briefed or even hinted at in the trial court. The trial judge never 
had any opportunity to consider and to rule on them. ACT should not 
now be permitted to raise these arguments in the Court of Appeals. They 
have not been preserved for appeal. Making them now ignores the legal 
standards for appeals and is frivolous. ACT should be sanctioned. 
III. IF THIS COURT AFFIRMS THE JUDGMENT FOR SHUSTER, IT 
SHOULD REMAND THE CASE FOR CALCULATION OF ATTORNEYS' 
FEES FOR THIS APPEAL. 
Utah statute mandates that an employee be allowed "reasonable 
attorneys fees" for any action brought to collect wages justly due. 
A. Attorneys' Fees Are A Matter of Right Under the Statute. 
As set forth above, Utah statute provides for attorneys fees in suits 
for wages. Utah Code Ann. § 34-27-1. If the court finds "that the 
amount" for which Mr. Shuster has brought suit "is justly due" then: 
"it shall be the duty of the court. . . to allow to the plaintiff a 
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reasonable attorneys' tee in addition to the amount found due for 
wages, to be taxed as costs of suit." Utah Code Ann. § 34-27-1. 
(emphasis added) 
The public policy behind enforcement of wage laws supports this 
mandatory award of attorneys' fees, even if they are large in comparison 
with the wages recovered: 
As a general rule, the amounts recoverable under the FLSA and the 
UPWA are so small that attorney fees will exceed any potential 
recovery. Hence, unless an award of attorney fees is available, 
workers would be unable to enforce their rights under these 
statutes. Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d at 474 (J. Stewart, 
concurring and dissenting). 
The general rule in awarding attorneys' fees is consistent with this 
principle. The legal work necessary to enforce a contract for a small 
amount may be just as time-consuming as enforcing a contract for a large 
amount: 
Although the amount in controversy can be a factor in determining 
a reasonable fee, care should be used in putting much reliance on 
this factor. It is a simple fact in a lawyer's life that it takes about 
the same amount of time to collect a note in the amount of $1000 
as it takes to collect a note for $100,000." Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah App., 1988). 
Similarly, the legal work necessary to defend a small judgment on appeal 
will relate more to the maneuvers and arguments made by the appellant 
than it will to the dollar amount of the judgment. 
27 
B. Where Attorneys' Fees are Mandated, they Should Be Awarded 
to a Successful Appellee for Work on Appeal. 
If this Court affirms the Circuit Court's judgment, it should order 
that the appellee's attorneys' fees in defending the Judgment through 
appeal be paid by the appellant-defendant ACT. Since 1980 it has been 
the rule of law in Utah that if attorneys' fees are mandated, this should 
include "attorneys' fees incurred by the prevailing party on appeal as well 
as at trial." Management Services v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 
406, 409 (Utah, 1980).13 In that case the parties had signed a contract 
which provided for attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in an action to 
enforce the contract. The Utah Supreme Court explained the principle 
behind the new rule of law it adopted: 
"The purpose of a provision for attorney's fees is to indemnify the 
creditor or the prevailing party against the necessity of paying an 
attorney's fee and to enable him to recover the full amount of the 
obligation. . . . If plaintiff is required to defend its position on 
appeal at its own expense plaintiff's rights under the contract are 
thereby diminished, at 409 quoting Zambruk v. Per/mutter Third 
General Builders, Inc., 510 P.2d 472 (Colo.App. 1973). 
This principle and policy applies equally in this case where state law 
provides for attorneys' fees. The public policy behind allowing a worker 
13
 On this point this case overruled Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate & 
Investment Co., 3 Utah 2d 121, 279 P.2d 709 (1955) and Downey State Bank 
v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 556 P.2d 1273 (Utah, 1976). 
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to recover attorneys' fees for successfully defending a wage claim on 
appeal is as strong (if not stronger) than the principle of enforcing parties7 
contracts14 as to attorneys7 fees. 
The general rule of law in Utah regarding attorneys fees on appeal 
is that "attorneys fees, when awarded as allowed by law, are awarded 
as a matter of legal right." (emphasis added) Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 
P.2d 622, 625 (Utah, 1989) This Court has enunciated the "general rule" 
in these word: 
[W]hen a party who received attorney fees below prevails on 
appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on 
appeal. Utah Dept. of Social Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 
1197 (Utah App. 1991) 
In that case this Court recognized that fees for appeal were properly 
awarded based not only upon contractual provisions, but also "when fees 
14
 Since the landmark decision of Management Services v. Development 
Associates, supra there have been numerous cases in which the Utah Supreme 
Court and this Court have affirmed that holding where the attorneys fees were 
based upon contractual provisions. See Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692, 
695 (Utah, 1982) (purchasers of subdivision lot rely upon Earnest Money 
Agreement); Bushnell Real Estate Inc. v. Nielson, 672 P.2d 746 (Utah, 1983) 
(promissory note); Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah, 1985) 
(uniform sales contract); G.G.A. Inc. v. Leventis, 773 P.2d 8 4 1 , 846 (Utah 
App. 1989) (lessee enforcing right to first refusal); Saunders v. Sharp, 840 P.2d 
796, 809-810 (Utah App. 1992) (purchasers of property seeking specific 
performance); Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah App. 1989) 
(attorneys fees to defendants in contract action after dismissal with prejudice). 
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in a divorce were awarded below to the party who then prevailed on 
appeal" citing Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah App. 1990), and 
"where basis for award of fees was mechanic's lien statute" citing 
Martindale v. Adams, 111 P.2d 514, 518 (Utah App. 1989). Utah Dept. 
of Social Services v. Adams at 1197. 
In this case attorneys' fees are based upon a statute which 
mandates15 the award of those fees to a wage earner who proves he 
was entitled to the wages claimed. The award of attorneys fees on 
appeal should be a matter of "legal right." 
Whenever a successful appellee is entitled to attorneys' fees for 
defending the Judgment, the proper remedy is for this Court to remand 
the case for the trial court to award reasonable fees for the appeal. 
Management Services v. Development Associated, 617 P.2d 406, 109 
(Utah, 1980); GGA Inc. v. Leventis, 773 P.2d 841, 847 (Utah App. 
1989); Cobabe v. Crawford. 780 P.2d 834 (Utah App. 1989). 
15
 Certain of the opinions dealing with attorneys fees under a contract have, 
in dicta, distinguished between contractual cases in which attorneys fees were 
a matter of right and cases of "applying a statute which allows the 
discretionary award of such fees." Saunders v. Sharp, supra at 809, Cobabe v. 
Crawford, supra at 836, both quoting Spinks v. Chevron Oil Co., 507 F.2d 
216, 226 (5th Cir. 1975). This dicta in not relevant to this case since the 
statutory award of fees to an employee enforcing a wage claim is NOT 
discretionary, but mandatory. 
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IV. APPELLANT ACT AND ITS COUNSEL SHOULD BE SANCTIONED FOR 
VIOLATION OF RULE 33 OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE. 
This Court should sanction appellant ACT and its counsel for its 
failure to comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure, for its improper 
and erroneous statements of facts (both in its Brief and its Docketing 
Statement) and for its attempt to raise issues in its brief which have not 
been preserved for appeal and which are patently frivolous. 
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that this 
Court "shall award just damages" for a "frivolous appeal, . . . or other 
paper. . . . not grounded in fact, nor warranted by existing law or 
. . . interposed for purpose of delay." Utah R. App. Pro. 33 (a) and (b). 
A. The Docketing Statement Violated Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure by Failing to Include Necessary Attachments 
and by Failing to State the Standard of Review. 
ACT failed to include as "necessary attachments" to its Docketing 
Statement the trial court's Memorandum Decision and its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, although these documents clearly fell within the 
category of "any opinion or findings" required to be attached. Rule 9(d)(2) 
Utah R. App. P. The appellee Shuster pointed out this failure in his Motion 
for Summary Disposition, Dismissal and Sanctions. Then Appellant ACT 
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filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Docketing Statement (August 
1) and appellee Shuster filed a Response asking that all corrections--not 
just those admitted to in the Motion-be made. (August 4). Before ACT's 
Motion was acted upon, ACT filed an Amended Docketing Statement 
(August 4). As noted by this Court, that Amended Docketing Statement 
"still does not include the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law." 
Order August 15, 1994. This Court ordered that ACT have: 
leave to amend the Docketing Statement. . . to include the addition 
of the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated 
March 21 , 1994 if such a document exists and to state the 
applicable standard of review. (Order August 15, 1994). 
Ultimately ACT did file all these "necessary attachments" and did state 
the standard of review. But getting this accomplished required additional 
and unnecessary work by appellee and by this Court. 
Even if ACT's failure to attach the proper documents was the result 
of negligence or inadvertence, it is nevertheless sanctionable. In Taylor 
v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 171-172 (Utah App. 1989) this Court 
held that attaching the wrong document-a will-to a complaint violated 
Rule 11 Utah R. Civ. P. and merited sanctions. The court explained that 
reasonable inquiry would have resulted in the proper document being 
attached. Here, too, a reasonable inquiry by ACT's counsel would have 
resulted in the proper documents being attached the first time. In Taylor 
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the court based its holding upon the further fact that plaintiff 's error 
caused the opponent to incur legal costs. Here, too, damages are 
appropriate since ACT's failure to comply wi th Rule 9 the first time 
caused appellee and this Court additional legal work. 
B. ACT's "Statement of Facts" is Not "Grounded in Fact" and 
Merits Sanctions. 
Both in its Docketing Statement and in its Brief, ACT has included 
"facts" which were not "material" to the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment for the plaintiff. Moreover, many of these alleged "facts" were 
not ever plead or averred by anyone in the trial court. The inclusion of 
these alleged "facts" is not grounded in fact or law. Where the evidence 
is "mischaracterized and misstated" to the appellate court, sanctions are 
appropriate. Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah App. 1987). 
ACT falsely sets forth the following in its Brief: 
Statement of Facts 
The facts material to the issue presented in this appeal are: . . . . 
2. 80% percent of ACT's revenues come from new sales . . . . 
3. ACT is only able to stay in business by seeking out and selling 
its products to new customers. (Brief p. 4) 
These same "facts" were set forth in ACT's Docketing Statement, 
Statement of Fact p. 2.16 These "facts" were not alleged in the Affidavit 
16
 The misstatements of " facts" material to the issues on appeal were made 
in the original, the Amended, and the Second Amended Docketing Statement. 
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of ACT's president (R 97-98; Add. F), were not reproduced in the 
contract, and were disputed (in part) by Mr. Shuster's Affidavit (R 119-
120 1 10; Add. H). More significantly, they formed no basis for the 
Circuit Court's grant of summary judgment for plaintiff, so they are 
clearly not "facts material to the issue presented in this appeal." Thus, 
these allegations are inappropriately cited as "facts" in both the Brief and 
the Docketing Statement. 
Second, ACT's "Statement of Facts" includes the following 
allegations which were disputed in part by plaintiff and which, moreover, 
were not material to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment: 
1. ACT is in the business of selling computer hardware and 
accounting software to beer, wine, soda and bottled water 
distributors throughout the United States. . . . 
4. On March 2, 1992 ACT hired Shuster as a commissioned 
salesman to call on potential new customers and attempt to sell 
ACT's products to them. (Brief p. 4-5) 
These same "facts" were set forth in the Docketing Statement, 
Statement of Fact -- Introduction p. 2. While the contract sets forth the 
nature of the business (R 8), it also allowed ACT to assign Mr. Shuster 
to particular duties within that business.17 The Affidavit of ACT's 
17
 The contract reads in relevant part: "Employer reserves the right to 
modify the . . . nature or type of prospective clients from whom Employee shall 
solicit business." R 8 Employment Agreement 1 1; Add. B. 
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president said nothing about what Mr. Shuster was hired to sell (R 97-98; 
Add. F); and Mr. Shuster's Affidavit (R 118 1 4; Add. H) and Reply 
Memorandum (R 109; Add. G) asserted that his duties were limited as 
permitted by the contract.18 Moreover, these disputed "facts" formed no 
basis for the Circuit Court's grant of summary judgment for plaintiff. 
Thus they, too, were inappropriately cited as "facts" to the Court of 
Appeals. 
Thirdly, ACT's Statement of Facts sets forth the following "facts" 
which ACT's president had averred in support of ACT's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, but which plaintiff Shuster had disputed: 
9. During the period of Shuster's employment with ACT, 8 1/2 
months, he earned commissions of $ 1,831.30 but received prepaid 
commissions of $11,632.86. (Brief p. 5) 
These same "facts" are set forth as "facts" in the Docketing Statement 
p. 3. Although these "facts" were alleged by ACT's President, they were 
disputed by Plaintiff (R 120 Affidavit 1 1 1 ; Add. H). Moreover, these 
disputed facts were irrelevant to plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R 109 Reply Memorandum; Add. G). 
None of the "facts" set forth above were found by the trial court. 
18
 The employee, Mr Shuster, was hired to sell only a portion of ACT's 
products to on certain clients (software and hardware to bottled water 
distributors) and in only certain states. 
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These were not "facts" relied upon by the trial court in finding that the 
contract was unambiguous, in interpreting that contract, or in granting 
the plaintiff summary judgment. Therefore, they are not facts "material" 
to this appeal. Thus, they are improperly included as "facts" in ACT's 
Brief and in ACT's Docketing Statement. 
What these allegations are is parole evidence ACT would like to 
present in a trial of this case. IF the contract is ambiguous, then ACT 
should have its chance to present parole evidence about the operation of 
its business and the plaintiff's conduct. IF the contract is ambiguous, 
then the plaintiff, too, should have an opportunity to present evidence 
about ACT's business and ACT's conduct toward him. But if (as the trial 
court found) the contract is unambiguous; then parole evidence should 
not be considered. ACT should not be permitted to surreptitiously present 
parole evidence on appeal when the only issue on appeal is whether the 
contract is unambiguous and what that contract says. 
ACT's improper attempts to present evidence in this case may tend 
to confuse the case. The likelihood is that these misstatements of law 
were made for the purposes of obfuscation and delay. This Court should 
award "just damages" for a this frivolous and improper statements of 
"fact" which are "not grounded in fact," are improper under the legal 
standard for reviewing the judgment of the trial court, and were most 
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probably interposed to confuse of delay the resolution of this case. Rule 
33 (a) and (b), Utah R. App. Pro. 
C. ACT's Brief Presents Arguments and Seeks Relief Not Grounded 
in Law Because the issues were Not Raised before the Trial Court, 
the Arguments are Patently Frivolous, and the Relief is Procedurally 
Unavailable. 
ACT's arguments that the Utah Payment of Wages ACT (UPWA) 
and the Attorneys Fees Act do not apply because Mr. Shuster was paid 
"commissions" and not "wages" are patently erroneous and frivolous. 
(See II.A. B. and C. supra). These arguments are further "not grounded 
in law" because they were never raised before the trial court and are 
improperly made for the first time on appeal. (See II. D. supra) 
The relief ACT seeks-vacate the Judgment for Shuster and grant 
Summary Judgment for ACT-is similarly not grounded in law for two 
reasons. First, ACT has waived any objection to a judgment for Mr. 
Shuster under the UPWA. In addition, ACT's Motion for Summary 
Judgment included as "material facts" matters that were disputed by Mr. 
Shuster (R 117-129 Affidavit; Add. H). (There alleged facts continue to 
be presented by ACT as "material facts" in this appeal. (See IV.B. supra.) 
Therefore, the only appropriate remedy for ACT to seek on appeal is to 
vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings (a trial) 
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before the trial court. 
This panoply of frivolous legal maneuvers merits sanctions under 
Rule 33. Utah R. App. Pro. The Utah Supreme Court found that Rule 33 
was violated and sanctions appropriate when there was "a complete lack 
of merit" to a cause of action. Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 417 (Utah, 
1990). In that case the defendant dentist had obtained summary 
judgment in a malpractice action by presenting affidavits denying his 
treatment caused plaintiff's injuries and averring his treatment met the 
standard of care. Plaintiff-appellant had failed to present affidavits 
controverting those of appellee. Instead, she appealed. That appeal, like 
ACT's arguments on the UPWA and on the Attorneys' Fees Act, lacked 
any legal merit. 
This Court made clear that a "frivolous" appeal under Rule 33 does 
not require a showing of bad faith. O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 310 
(Utah App. 1987). Rather, an appeal is "frivolous" if it has "no 
reasonable legal or factual basis."Id. ACT's arguments regarding the 
UPWA and Attorneys Fees Act are totally frivolous under this standard. 
Rules sanctioning frivolous pleadings do "not impose a duty to do perfect 
or exhaustive research. The appropriate standard is whether the research 
was objectively reasonable under all the circumstances." Barnard v. 
Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah, 1992) (Sanctions inappropriate 
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under Rule 11 Utah R.Civ.Pro.) Here ACT's research seems 
nonexistent. ACT did not even read the complete statute before arguing 
in its brief that the UWPA and the Attorneys Fees Act do not apply to 
employees who are paid commissions. (See II.A-C above). ACT similarly 
did not read Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mark Inc., 417 P. 2d 761, 765 
(Utah, 1966), the case which holds salesmen are entitled to rely upon the 
Attorneys' Fees Act in collecting commissions wrongly withheld them. 
ACT did not read or ignored the complete language of the statute, despite 
the fact that it was set forth and explained in Plaintiff's Memorandum (R 
70-71, fn. 6; Add. D). ACT ignored the case on point despite the fact 
that it, too, was cited in appellee's Memorandum to the trial court. (R 72; 
Add. D) Such absence of research is unreasonable under any set for 
circumstances. 
An "appeal brought for delay is one marked by dilatory conduct or 
conduct designed to mislead the court and which benefits only the 
appellant." O'Brien v. Bush, at 310. The omission of the trial court's 
Order and Findings both delays and misleads the court. The 
misstatement of facts misleads the court. The attempt to raise issues on 
appeal that were never raised before the trial court improperly delays the 
case and misleads the court. The prayer for relief that is unavailable 
misleads the court. 
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"[W]hen there is no basis for the argument presented and when the 
evidence or law is mischaracterized and misstated" sanctions are 
appropriate. Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah App. 1987). In 
this case, too, the number of statements and arguments made which 
have no basis in fact or law should lead this Court to sanction the 
appellant ACT and ACT's counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, appellee Lee Shuster asks this 
Court to affirm the Judgment of the Circuit Court, to award the appellee 
costs pursuant to Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to 
remand the case to the trial court for the calculation of reasonable 
attorneys' fees in defending the Judgment, to find the appellant and its 
counsel to have violated Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
and to order just damages pursuant to Rule 33 beyond the attorneys' fees 
otherwise provided for by statute. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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CHAPTER 27 
ATTORNEYS' FEES IN SUITS FOR WAGES 
Section 
34-27-1. Reasonable amount — Taxed as costs. 
34-27-1. Reasonable amount — Taxed as costs. 
Whenever a mechanic, artisan, miner, laborer, ser-
vant, or other employee shall have cause to bring suit 
for wages earned and due according to the terms of 
his employment and shall establish by the decision of 
the court that the amount for which he has brought 
suit is justly due, and that a demand has been made 
in writing at least fifteen days before suit was 
brought for a sum not to exceed the amount so found 
due, then it shall be the duty of the court before 
which the case shall be tried to allow to the plaintiff a 
reasonable attorneys' fee in addition to the amount 
found due for wages, to be taxed as costs of suit. 1969 
CHAPTER 28 
PAYMENT OF WAGES 
34-28-L Public and certain other employments 
excepted. 
None of the provisions of this chapter shall apply to 
the state, or to any county, incorporated city or town, 
or other political subdivision, or to employers and em-
ployees engaged in farm, dairy, agricultural, viticul-
tural or horticultural pursuits or to stock or poultry 
raising, or to household domestic service, or to any 
other employment where an agreement exists be-
tween employer and employee providing for different 
terms of payment, except the provisions of Section 
34-28-5 shall apply to employers or employees en-
gaged in farm, dairy, agricultural, viticultural, horti-
cultural or stock or poultry raising. 1973 
34-28-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) The word "employer" includes every per-
son, firm, partnership, association, corporation, 
receiver or other officer of a court of this state, 
and any agent or officer of any of the above-men-
tioned classes, employing any person in this 
state. 
(2) The word "wages" means all amounts due 
the employee for labor or services, whether the 
amount is fixed or ascertained on a time, task, 
piece, commission basis or other method of calcu-
lating such amount. 1969 
UTAH CODE 
34-28-5. Separation from payroll — Resignation 
— Cessation because of industrial dis-
pute. 
(1) (a) Whenever an employer separates an em-
ployee from his payroll the unpaid wages of the 
employee become due immediately, and the em-
ployer shall pay the wages to the employee 
within 24 hours of the time of separation at the 
specified place of payment. 
(b) This section does not apply to the earnings 
of a sales agent employed on a commission basis 
who has custody of accounts, money, or goods of 
his principal if the net amount due the agent is 
determined only after an audit or verification of 
sales, accounts, funds, or stocks. 
(2) In case of failure to pay wages due an employee 
within 24 hours of written demand, the wages of the 
employee shall continue from the date of demand 
until paid, but in no event to exceed 60 days, at the 
same rate which the employee received at the time of 
separation. The employee may recover the penalty 
thus accruing to him in a civil action. This action 
must be commenced within 60 days from the date of 
separation. Any employee who has not made a writ-
ten demand for payment is not entitled to any penalty 
under this subsection. 
(3) If an employee does not have a written contract 
for a definite period and resigns his employment, the 
wages earned become due and payable not later than 
72 hours after the resignation, unless the employee 
gave 72 hours previous notice of his intention to re-
sign, in which case the employee shall receive his 
wages at the specified place of payment at the time of 
resignation. 
(4) If work ceases as the result of an industrial dis-
pute, the wages earned and unpaid at the time of this 
cessation become due and payable at the next regular 
payday, as provided in Section 34-28-3, including, 
without abatement or reduction, all amounts due all 
persons whose work has been suspended as a result of 
the industrial dispute, together with any deposit or 
other guaranty held by the employer for the faithful 
performance of the duties of the employment. IW9 
UTAH CODE 
34-40-101. Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Utah Minimum 
Wage Act." 1990 
34-40-102. Definitions. 
(1) This chapter and the terms used in it, including 
the computation of wages, shall be interpreted consis-
tently with 29 U.S.C. Sec. 201 et seq., the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938, as amended, to the extent that 
act relates to the payment of a minimum wage. 
(2) As used in this chapter: 
(a) "Commission" means the Industrial Com-
mission of Utah. 
(b) "Minimum wage" means the state mini-
mum hourly wage for adult employees as estab-
lished under this chapter, unless the context 
clearly indicates otherwise. 1990 
34-40-103. Minimum wage — Commiss ion to re-
v iew, modify min imum w a g e . 
(1) (a) The minimum wage for all private and pub-
lic employees within the state shall be $3.35 per 
hour. 
(b) Effective April 1, 1990, the minimum wage 
shall be $3.80 per hour. 
(2) (a) Subsequent to July 1, 1990, the commission 
may by rule establish the minimum wage or 
wages as provided in this chapter which may be 
paid to employees in public and private employ-
ment within the state. 
(b) The minimum wage, as established by the 
commission, may not exceed the federal mini-
mum wage as provided in 29 U.S.C. Sec. 201 et 
seq., the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as 
amended, in effect at the time of implementation 
of this section. 
(c) The commission: 
(i) may review the minimum wage at any 
time; 
(it) shall review the minimum wage at 
least every three years; and 
(iii) shall review the minimum wage 
whenever the federal minimum wage is 
changed. 
(3) The commission may provide for separate mini-
mum hourly wages for minors. 1990 
34-40-104. Exempt ions . 
(1) The minimum wage established in this chapter 
does not apply to any employee who is entitled to a 
minimum wage as provided in 29 U.S.C. Sec. 201 et 
seq., the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as 
amended. In addition, the minimum wage does not 
apply to the following: 
(a) outside sales persons; 
UNITED STATES CODE 
ANNOTATED 
Title 29 
Labor 
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS 
§ 206. Minimum wage 
(a) Employees engaged in commerce; home workers in Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands; 
employees in American Samoa; seamen on American vessels; agricultural employees 
Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any workweek is engaged 
in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise 
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, wages at the 
Mowing rates: 
(1) except as otherwise provided in this section, not less than $3.35 an hour 
during the period ending March 31, 1990, not less than $3.80 an hour during the 
year beginning April 1, 1990, and not less than $4.25 an hour after March 31, 1991; 
$ 213. Exemptions 
(a) The provisions of section 206 (except subsection (d) in the case of paragraph (1) of 
this subsection) and section 207 of this title shall not apply with respect to— 
(1) any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or profes-
sional capacity (including any employee employed in the capacity of academic 
administrative personnel or teacher in elementary or secondary schools), or in the 
capacity of outside salesman (as such terms are defined and delimited from time to 
time by regulations of the Secretary, subject to the provisions of subchapter II of 
chapter 5 of Title 5, except that an employee of a retail or service establishment 
shall not be excluded from the definition of employee employed in a bona fide 
executive or administrative capacity because of the number of hours in his work-
week which he devotes to activities not directly or closely related to the perfor-
mance of executive or administrative activities, if less than 40 per centum of his 
hours worked in the workweek are devoted to such activities); or 
29 Crt Ch. V (7-1-93 Edition) 
§ 541.5 Outside salesman. 
The term employee employed * • • in 
the capacity of outside salesman in 
section 13(aXl) of the Act shall mean 
any employee: 
(a) Who is employed for the purpose 
of and who is customarily and regular-
ly engaged away from his employer's 
place or places of business in: 
(1) Making sales within the meaning 
of section 3(k) of the Act, or 
(2) Obtaining orders or contracts for 
services or for the use of facilities for 
which a consideration will be paid by 
the client or customer; and 
(b) Whose hours of work of a nature 
other than that described in para-
graph (a)(1) or (2) of this section do 
not exceed 20 percent of the hours 
worked in the workweek by nonex-
empt employees of the employer: Pro-
vided, That work performed incidental 
to and in conjunction with the em-
ployee's own outside sales or solicita-
tions, including incidental deliveries 
and collections, shall not be regarded 
as nonexempt work. UTAH 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
CODE 
R572-1-3. Coverage. 
A. All employers employing workers in the State of 
Utah, except those exempted by Section 34-40-104, 
shall pay the established minimum hourly wage of 
$4.25 for all hours employed, effective April 1, 1991. 
B. As per Sections 34-23-301 and 34-40-103, a 
minor employee may not be paid less than 85% of the 
state minimum hourly wage in effect for adult em-
ployees as delineated in R572-1-3(A). 
C. Any employer claiming exemption under Sub-
section 34-40-104(1 )<j) shall provide to the Division a 
statistical report of the average wage paid within 60 
days of the end of the regular operating season. The 
Division may, upon notice, perform an on-site inspec-
tion to verify the report in accordance with Sections 
34-40-201 and 34-40-203. 
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LINDA FAYE SMITH, #4460 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
C/O University of Utah 
College of Law 
Salt Lake City, UT 84112 
Telephone: 581-4077 
CE: \u ; 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
LEE K. SHUSTER, * 
* 
Plaintiff, * 
vs. * COMPLAINT 
* 
* 
APPLIED COMPUTER TECHNIQUES * Civil No. Y ^ a o / ^ f S " ^ 
INC. * 
* Judge rac^x-
Defendant. * 
Plaintiff Lee K. Shuster complains of Defendant Applied 
Computer Techniques, Inc. ("ACT") as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff Lee K. Shuster is an individual residing in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. 
2. Defendant Applied Computer Techniques, Inc. (hereinafter 
"ACT") is a corporation incorporated in the state of Utah, with its 
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principal place of business at 772 East 3300 South, Suite 200, Salt 
Lake City, in Salt Lake County, Utah, 
3. The amount claimed is less than $10,000, exclusive of 
costs. 
FACTS 
4. On or about February 11, 1992 and again on or about March 
2, 1992 Plaintiff Lee K. Shuster entered into an Employment 
Agreement with Defendant Applied Computer Techniques, Inc., (ACT) 
which Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated 
herein. 
5. From February 26, 1992 through October 14, 1992 Plaintiff 
Lee Shuster worked pursuant to said Employment Agreement, "devoting 
all of his time and energy during normal business hours" to ACT's 
business (Agreement paragraph 4). 
6. From approximately February 26, 1992 through September 30, 
1992 Defendant ACT paid Plaintiff Lee Shuster the "gross pay" 
provided for under Paragraph 6 of said Employment Agreement, since 
the commissions earned never exceeded such "gross pay." 
7. On or about October 14, 1992 Defendant ACT, through its 
President Vaughn Christensen, terminated the Employment Agreement 
with Plaintiff Lee K. Shuster. 
8. On or about October 14, 1992 Defendant ACT offered 
Plaintiff Lee Shuster a new contract for employment, including a 
2 
provision to pay Plaintiff on a straight commission basis. 
9. On October 15, 1992 Plaintiff Lee Shuster confirmed ACT'S 
termination of the Employment Agreement, declined to enter into a 
new contract for compensation on a straight commission basis, and 
gave written demand to ACT for payment of wages for his all work 
from October 1 through October 14, 1992. Said response and written 
demand is attached as Exhibit "B". 
10. On or about October 19, 1992 Defendant ACT failed and 
refused to make any payment to Plaintiff Lee Shuster for work 
performed from October 1 through October 14, 1992, on the ground 
that "no commissions were earned" during that period. ACT's letter 
refusing to pay Plaintiff any wages is attached as Exhibit "C". 
11. On or about November 19, 1992 Plaintiff Lee Shuster again 
made written request for payment of the wages owed, requested 
"gross pay" under the Employment Agreement (Paragraph 6) in the 
amount of $750.00, and informed Defendant ACT that its failure and 
refusal to pay any wages not only violated the Agreement, but 
violated state and federal minimum wage law and Utah Code Ann. § 
34-28-5 (Supp. 1992). Plaintiff's second written request is 
attached as Exhibit "D". 
12. On or about December 1, 1992 Defendant ACT paid Plaintiff 
minimum wage for 80 hours of work from October 1 to October 14, 
1992, totalling $340; and again failed and refused to pay the 
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"gross pay" due under paragraph 6 of the Employment Agreement. 
ACT's letter admitting Plaintiff's entitlement to minimum wage and 
refusing to pay the "gross pay" under the Agreement is attached as 
Exhibit "E." 
COUNT I 
1 3 . On or about October 15, 1992 Defendant ACT owed P l a i n t i f f 
Lee S h u s t e r "gross pay" of $ 7 5 0 . 0 0 under Paragraph 6 of the 
Employment Agreement, for t h e two weeks of work from October 1 
t h r o u g h October 14 , 1992. 
1 4 . Defendant ACT's r e f u s a l t o pay t h e "gross pay" of $750.00 
t o P l a i n t i f f Lee Shuster for h i s work from October 1 through 
O c t o b e r 14 , 1992 i s a v i o l a t i o n of s a i d Employment Agreement. 
COUNT I I 
15. Plaintiff Lee Shuster repeats and realleges Paragraphs 4 
through 12. 
16. Defendant ACT has at all relevant times maintained and 
had custody of all sales records necessary to determine commissions 
and gross pay owed to Plaintiff Lee Shuster. 
17. On October 15, 1992 Defendant ACT knew that no sales had 
occurred during the period from October 1 through October 14, 1992 
and thus knew that no commissions were owed to Plaintiff Lee 
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Shuster at the time of separation from employment. 
18. Despite Plaintiff Shuster's written demand on October 15, 
1992, to be paid for his work from October 1 through October 14, 
1992 Defendant ACT failed and refused to pay Plaintiff Lee Shuster 
any wages at all for over forty-five (45) days, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5 (Supp. 1992). 
19. Despite Plaintiff Lee Shuster's second written demand on 
November 19, 1992, Defendant ACT failed and refused to pay 
Plaintiff Lee Shuster the wages due under the Employment Agreement, 
and paid wages based upon minimum wage law over forty-five (45) 
days after Plaintiff's separation (and 12 days after the second 
demand), in violation of Utah Code Ann. §34-28-5 (Supp. 1992). 
20. Given Defendant's failure to pay the wages owed under the 
Agreement, Plaintiff Shuster's wages continue as a civil penalty 
for sixty (60) days at the rate under the Agreement ($1500 per 
month) pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5(2) (Supp. 1992). 
COUNT III 
21. Plaintiff Lee Shuster repeats and realleges Paragraphs 4 
through 12. 
22. Plaintiff Lee Shuster repeats and realleges Paragraphs 15 
through 19. 
23. Given Defendant's failure to pay even minimum wage as 
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wages owed Plaintiff for over forty-five (45) days following 
separation and demand, Plaintiff Shuster's entitlement to minimum 
wage continues as a civil penalty from October 15 to December 1, 
1992 pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5(2) (Supp. 1992). 
COUNT IV 
24. Plaintiff repeats and realleges Paragraphs 4-12. 
25. Plaintiff repeats and realleges Paragraphs 15-19. 
26. On or about November 19, 1992, at least 15 days before 
filing this action, Plaintiff Lee Shuster made written demand for 
$750.00 in gross pay, the wages due under the Employment Agreement. 
27. On or about November 19, 1992, at least 15 days before 
filing this action, Plaintiff Lee Shuster offered to settle his 
claim to any civil penalty under Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5 (Supp. 
1992) for $750 in gross pay. 
28. Plaintiff Lee Shuster is entitled to reasonable 
attorneys' fee in addition to the amount due for wages and 
penalties, to be taxed as costs of suit, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34-27-1 (Repl.Vol.1988) . 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Lee Shuster prays for judgment against 
Defendant Applied Computer Techniques, Inc. as follows: 
a. an award of damages for gross pay due and owing under the 
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Employment Agreement in the amount of $410.00; and 
b. an award of damages as a civil penalty for ACT'S failure 
to pay wages owed in a timely fashion, such penalty to equal the 
wage rate to which Plaintiff was entitled at the time of separation 
until paid or for 60 days, in an amount not less than $1020.00 if 
the Court finds Plaintiff entitled to wages at the minimum wage 
rate and not less than $3000.00 if the Court finds Plaintiff 
entitled to gross pay under the Employment Agreement; and 
c. reasonable attorneys' fees; and 
d. such other relief as is just and equitable. 
DATED this 14th day of December, 1992. 
LINDA FAYE SMITH 
Linda Faye»Sn£th^(Bar No. 4460) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Lee K. Shuster 
c/o University of Utah 
College of Law 
Salt Lake City, UT 84112 
Telephone: (801) 581-4 077 
Plaintiff's Name: Lee K. Shuster 
Plaintiff's Address: 1337 Yale Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 85105 
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EXHIBIT A 
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
This Agreement is made this 2_%ay of ftl A&fijf- . 1922fby and between Applied Computer 
Techniques, a Utah corporation (hereinafter called "Employer) and sLee ^ Sjti/fT'&T (hereinafter 
called •Employee"), witnesseth: 
WHEREAS, Employer is engaged in the business of marketing computer data processing and 
information handling systems to end-users, including beer, wine, soda and bottled water distributors, and 
other distribution-oriented businesses; 
WHEREAS, Employer desires to engage Employee to market its goods and services primarily to 
beer, wine, soda and bottled water distributors, and other distribution-oriented businesses located 
throughout the world; 
WHEREAS, Employee desires to be employed by Employer subject to the terms and conditions 
contained in this Agreement; 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual warranties, covenants and conditions herein 
contained, Employer and Employee hereby agree as follows: 
1. PURPOSE: Employer engages Employee to market its goods and services to beer, wine, soda 
and bottled water distributors, and other distribution-oriented businesses located throughout the world. 
It is not intended that the entire world shall be the exclusive territory of Employee. Employer 
reserves the right to modify the geographic scope of Employee's territory as well as the nature or type of 
prospective clients from whom Employee shall solicit business. 
2. TERM: The term of employment under this Agreement shall begin on rE0>PuA&/ Z& 
19j£Zrand continue until terminated as herein provided. 
3. DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS: Employer hereby employs Employee to act as a sales 
representative whose duties shall include, but not be necessarily limited to the following: 
A. Identify and contact prospective users of products of Employer in designated geographical 
areas; 
B. Meet in person or by telephone with management representatives of such prospective users 
and survey their present and future data processing and information handling needs and recommend 
products of Employer where applicable; 
C. Produce and provide to prospective customers timely written proposals detailing the costs, 
functions, and benefits of the proposed products and services of Employers; 
D. Meet in person or by telephone with the decision-making representatives of prospective 
customers in an effort to obtain orders for products and services of Employer; 
E. When directed by management, assist in the collection of all sums due from persons to whom 
the goods and merchandise of Employer are sold and in the adjustment of any complaints or disputes that 
may arise in connection with any sales made by him. 
4. PERFORMANCE: Employee agrees to devote all of his time and efforts during normal 
business hours of Employer to the performance and duties on behalf of Employer in the role of sales 
representative. In carrying out his duties, Employee has no authority to Incur obligations or make financial 
apresentations or financial commitments on behalf of Employer, except as approved by Employer prior 
} such commitments. 
5. COMPENSATION: For all of the services to be rendered by Employee in any capacity 
lereunder, Employer agrees to pay Employee a commission based upon Employee's sales of the goods 
ind services offered by Employer. 
A. The commission rate shall be: 
1) Twenty (20) percent of the gross profit on each sale to a new customer which Is attributable 
to Employee. 
"New customer- is defined to be any firm or party who has not previously purchased from 
Employer. 
"Gross profit" shall mean the difference between the total revenue actually received by Employer 
for each sale attributable to Employee, less the actual cost to Employer of the goods sold by Employee, 
less any charges to the customer for custom programming and/or training, less the actual cost to Employer 
of Employee's travel, meals and lodging attributed to each sale on a sale-by-sale basis, less any charge 
backs. 
"Charge backs" shall mean products returned to Employer from customer for any reason and in 
any time frame, or products which are not fully paid for by buyer after a period of sixty (60) days. Charge 
backs to Employee due to failure by the buyer to remit payment in full will become commissionaire to 
Employee once full payment has been received by Employer from buyer. 
By way of example, if gross sales by Employee and cost of product related to such sales are 
$25,000 and $12,500 respectively, and the gross sale includes $1,000 of custom programming and/or 
training, and the cost of Employee's travel, meals and lodging associated with the sale is $1,000, and a 
customer returned a $1,000 product for which the Employee had previously been paid a commission, the 
gross profit would be computed as follows: 
$ 25,000 Gross sales 
- 12,500 Cost of product 
- 1,000 Custom programming and/or training 
- 1,000 Cost of travel, meals, and lodging 
- 1.000 Charge back for returned product 
$ 9,500 Gross profit 
$9,500x.20 « $1,900 
Any sale which is deferred because of the unavailability of required custom programming to be 
performed by Employer will be considered to be a sale to a "New Customer" for the purpose of determining 
the commission rate. 
2) Sales of products or services to an existing customer will be commissionable to Employee 
under the following conditions and according to the following commission schedule: 
(a) The sale is directly attributable to Employee's efforts; 
(b) Employee was responsible for the initial sale made to the customer; 
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(c) The sale to the existing customer is made within one year.of customers' initial purchase. The 
following schedule will be made to determine the commission percentage paid to Employee: 
Days Following Initial Purchase Commission rate 
1 through 90 days Twenty (20) percent 
91 through 270 days Fifteen (15) percent 
271 through 365 days Ten (10) percent 
"Existing customer* Is defined as any firm or party who has previously purchased from Employer. 
3) Sales to a multiple system customer will be commissionable to Employee at eleven (11) percent 
of the gross profit on each sale, provided that: 
(a) The sale is directly attributable to Employee's efforts; 
(b) Employee was responsible for the initial sale made to the customer. 
"Multiple system customer" is defined to be any firm or party who purchases more than one 
software license for the same software module(s). 
B. The commission provided for herein shall be payable to Employee on the next occurring 
regular payday of Employer immediately after becoming a commissionable sale. 
-Next occurring regular payday* shall mean the earliest of either the sixteenth day of the current 
month or the first day of the following month. 
"Commissionable sale" shall mean a sale for which Employee has received the Employer's 
Purchase Agreement from the prospect, properly signed and executed by a duly authorized representative 
of the prospect firm or institution, and a deposit of not less than seventy-five (75) percent of the total 
purchase price. 
C. Employer shall furnish Employee upon request the data and computations used in arriving at 
the commission amount. 
D. In the event Employee ceases to be employed by Employer for any reason, Employee shall be 
entitled to commissions as described herein for commissionable sales received by Employer which are 
attributable to Employee's efforts for a period of thirty (30) days following Employee's termination, less any 
charge backs arising from previous sales by Employee which may occur during the above 30-day period 
following termination, less any outstanding draws which may exist 
6. DRAW: Employee will be paid a draw against future commissions according to the following 
schedule: 
Draw 
$2,800 per month 02/z c/fz. - 6 ffz^ 7-
$2,200 per month W/i7//z. • .)Gfa<*M*> 
$1,500 per month Q shifts -
Days Following Employment r  
1 through 60 days 
61 through 90 days 
91 days on $1,500 per onth 0 ^ ^Jr 
If commissions earned do not equal the draw per month as outlined above, Employer shall add that 
amount necessary to cause Employee's gross pay to equal the monthly amount shown, such amount to 
be considered a draw against future commissions. In any month In which commissions earned exceed 
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,500 and a draw balance exists, the excess over $2,500 shall be used to recover any outstanding draws 
aviously paid to Employee. 
7. PRODUCT PRICING AND POLICIES. All prices, discount policies, sales and service policies 
II be established by Employer and adhered to by Employee. Employer shall promptly notify Employee 
all price and policy changes and new product availability. 
8. SALES ACCEPTANCE* Employer reserves the right of final decision on any sales, including 
ceptance of any orders. Employee will obtain written approval In advance on all proposals offered in 
itten form to prospective customers. 
9. INSURANCE: Employee shall be entitled to coverage under Employer's existing health and 
;cident plan if he qualifies thereunder and is in accordance with the terms of such written insurance 
>licy and program. Coverage shall be provided at no cost beginning 90 days after employment date, 
lould Employee elect to cover dependents, Employer shall deduct the premium from Employee's check 
i a monthly basis and at the then-current rates. Employer shall advise Employee of any changes In the 
surance policies and company policies with respect thereto prior to the effective date of any such change. 
10. VACATION: Employee shall be entitled to receive vacation pay according to the following 
;hedule: 
irst year 1/52 of total earned commission during the first year of employment 
econd through eighth year 2/52 of total earned commission during each year of employment 
inth year and on 3/52 of total earned commission during each year of employment 
"Earned commission" shall mean the commission amount paid to Employee for sales directly 
ttributable to Employee. 
Pay will be paid as a bonus each year on the anniversary date of Employee's employment as 
tipulated in paragraph 2, Terms. 
11. EXPENSES: Employer shall reimburse Employee for all expenses incurred by Employee in 
jrtherance of his duties and obligations under this Agreement contingent upon prior approval of such 
ixpenses by Employer and receipt of proper documentary evidence in support of such expenses. In that 
egard, Employee agrees to report his expenses on a weekly basis in a daily diary format Expenses shall 
>e broken down by client and shall be on forms acceptable to Employer. 
Only the following items shall be reimbursable: 
A. Actual travel and lodging expense directly related to sales and marketing efforts. 
B. Meals expense while out-of-town overnight, to a maximum of $25 per day. 
C. In the event Employee must use his own automobile, a mileage allowance of 25.5 cents per 
mile will be paid, provided Employee submits a mileage log identifying actual odometer readings and other 
documentary evidence as may be required by Employer. 
In addition, Employer shall furnish Employee with a telephone credit card and/or other means of 
covering the costs associated with making long-distance, business-related telephone calls. 
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12. ITEMS FURNISHED BY EMPLOYER: 
A. Employer shall provide Employee with computer hardware and software for demonstration 
purposes and for use in preparing presentation material for clients and prospective clients as deemed 
necessary by Employer. Hardware and software furnished Employee shall remain the property of 
Employer and shall be returned to Employer promptly upon termination of this Agreement Employee shafl 
be liable to Employer for the loss, theft or damage to the software and/or hardware while In employee4! 
personal possession. When necessary to release software and/or hardware to any third party. Employee 
shall exercise utmost judgment and Insure the equipment wherever possfble. 
B. Employer shall furnish Employee with client and prospective client information which shall 
include but not be limited to mail and telephone lists, as well as proprietary, demographic Information 
pertaining to clients and prospective clients. Upon termination of this Agreement, Employee shall promptly 
return all of such data and information to Employer. 
13. TERMINATION: Either party may terminate this Agreement at any time, without cause and 
without advance notice. 
14. DEATH: In the event Employee's death occurs during the term of this Agreement, the 
Agreement shall terminate immediately and Employee's legal representative shall be entitled to receive any 
compensation due to Employee under the provisions outlined above. 
15. CONFIDENTIALITY: Since Employee will have access to the information which a customer 
of Employer may deem to be confidential, Employee agrees that he will keep all such information, data, 
and materials of such customers fully confidential and shall not disclose such information or data to 
anyone who is not an employee or employer of the customer except on specific order of a court of a 
competent jurisdiction. Employee further agrees that all written materials, software programs, tapes, card 
decks, or other physical embodiment of any software program relating to the business of Employer and 
its customer, whether prepared by Employee or received by Employee during his employment or thereafter, 
and any copies thereof all belong solely to Employer. 
Employee further agrees that all company information including contracts, customer lists, prospect 
lists, proprietary product information, company procedures and policies, etc. shall be deemed to be 
confidential and all such material shall belong solely to Employer despite the fact that they may have been 
prepared in part or wholly by Employee or Employee may have received copies thereof during the course 
of his employment. At any time during or after the employment period, Employee will upon the request 
of Employer deliver all of such items to Employer and shall retain no copies. All of such materials written 
or produced by Employee or under his supervision at any time during his employment shall be and are 
owned by Employer if they relate in any manner to the business of Employer either now or In the future. 
Employee will not during or after the term of his employment furnish to any individual, firm or corporation 
any list of customers or other information relating to Employer's business. He will at all times protect all 
proprietary information of Employer and will not disclose or use any of the computer programs and 
materials related to it which are used by Employer in its business which are proprietary to Employer, 
16. COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE: Employee agrees that during his employment and for a 
period of two years immediately following the termination of his employment for any reason he will not 
either alone or with or on behalf of any other person, firm, partnership, or corporation undertake to 
compete with Employer or seek to divert business or destroy or affect the business relationship that exists 
between Employer and its customers. 
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17. NO INTERFERENCE OF EMPLOYMENT: Following Employee's termination of employment, 
nployee will not solicit for hire any current employee of Employer. 
18. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF EMPLOYEE: Employee represents aiid 
irrants as follows: 
A. That by entering into this Agreement and performing the duties and obligations outlined herein, 
) is not in violation of any contract of employment previously entered into with another employer; 
B. That during the term of this Agreement, Employee will not misrepresent any of the products 
services offered by Employer; 
C. That during the term of this Agreement, Employee will not violate the copyright or trade secret 
ovisions of any software license agreement, non-disclosure agreement, or confidentiality agreement, 
mployer has executed or may be required to execute during the course of Employee's employment. 
In the event a legal action is threatened or maintained against Employer arising out of or related 
Employee's warranties and representations, Employee agrees to indemnify and hold harmless Employer 
r all legal costs and expenses associated with the defense of such actions, as well as any monetary 
dgments taken against Employer as a result of such actions. 
19, EFFECT OF WAIVER: The waiver of any party of a breach of any provision of this 
greement shall not operate or be construed as a waiver of any subsequent breach thereof. 
20. NOTICE: Any and all notices required herein shall be sufficient if furnished in writing, sent 
/ registered mail, to the respective parties at their address described below following their signatures to 
lis Agreement Such other addresses as needed may hereinafter by supplied by either party. 
21 ENTIRE AGREEMENT: This Agreement contains the entire agreement of the parties and 
upersedes all prior written and oral communications. 
22. AMENDMENT: Any amendment, modification or change shall be in writing and signed by 
oth parties and shall be amended hereto. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement on the day and year 
rst above-written. 
EMPLOYEE^ .EMPLOYER 
:mployee signature VaugrurJ ChrisWnsen 
/ £ £ g K. $!>HVS-TQ<, Applied Computer Techniques 772 East 3300 South, #200 
Employee name printed Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
rPrttr/stKc&'ry, UT 
Employee address 
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EXHIBIT B 
1337 East Yale Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105-1612 
October 15,1992 
Dear Vaughn: 
Attached you will find the letter I have been preparing to memorialize and to respond to our meetings of 
October 7 and 8, 1002. That lattar give* you the response you asked for regarding your offer of 
employment on a straight commission basis and it responds to your request for ideas about ACTs sales 
and marketing strategy. 
I am writing this additional letter to clarify the situation in light of the memo you handed me yesterday. 
Gene Castle (the other salesman) and I both understood you and Linda to announce a termination of our 
Employment Agreements effective November 15, 1992. I believe that is what Gene's letter sets forth (to 
which your memo is a response). I also understood that to be the situation in light of the Draw and 
Commission Report which included Linda's handwritten calculations of future compensation to be paid 
to me into November,(Linda's notes indicated a cap on draw of $13,464.16, now your memo gives a cap 
which has inexplicitly changed to $13,000.00.) 
Now your written memo states that you are terminating my Agreement immediately. Accordingly, I will 
be removing my property today (October 15). 
Your October 14 memo states that the termination of the Agreement "will become effective 
Wednesday October 7,1992" since it was your "intention to terminate the Employment Agreement... 
and execute a new one... as of that same date." It is not profitable to dispute what your intention may 
have been or what we remember you saying last week. 
The Agreement entitles you to 'terminate this Agreement at any time, without cause and without 
advance notice" (Para. 13). However, the Agreement also requires that "Any amendment modification, 
or change shall be in writing and signed by both parties M (Para. 22) and "Any and all notices 
required herein shall be sufficient if furnished in writing "(Para. 20). Accordingly the Agreement 
was not terminated on October 7, and no new agreement went into effect on October 7. Rather, you 
have terminated my employment as of today. Please let me know when I may come in to pick up my 
final pay check for my work (including the preliminary market analysts you requested) through October 
14,1992. 
I think it should be abundantly clear to you that I have absolutely no interest or desire to accept the totally 
unreasonable contractual terms that you have presented. The precipitous action you have taken 
yesterday only reconfirms my conclusion that your firm has very little ability to engage in fiscal analysis 
or sound business planning. Best of luck to you I 
Lee K. Shuster 
Account Representative 
EXHIBIT C 
S oppled oorr^uter technique/ 
772 East 3300 South 
Suite 200 
Salt lake City, Utah 84106 
(801)486-0073 
October 19, 1992 
Lee Shuster 
1337 East Yale Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105-1612 
Dear Lee: 
In your resignation letter of October 15, 1992, you 
asked me to let you know when you could come in to pick 
up your final pay check "for my work.••through October 
14, 1992." In response I would like to remind you that 
your compensation is not based upon 'your work' during 
the pay period, but instead, it is based upon commissions 
earned on ACT goods and services you sell. 
Paragraph 5 of the Employment Agreement that you and 
I signed plainly states that "Employer agrees to pay 
Employee a commission based upon Employee's sales of the 
goods and services offered by Employer.11 As you didn't 
have any sales during the pay period, no commissions were 
earned. 
Further, per the Agreement in paragraph 5D, you are 
"entitled to commissions as described herein for 
commissionable sales received by Employer which are 
attributable to Employee's efforts for a period of thirty 
(30) days following Employee's termination, less any 
charge backs arising from previous sales by Employee 
which may occur during the above 30-day period following 
termination, less any outstanding draws which may exist." 
Accordingly, a final settlement between us will be 
made on November 14, 1992, at which time, you will be 
paid for all commissions earned between October 15 and 
November 14, 1992, less any charge backs which may arise, 
less the outstanding draws issued you to date of 
$11,632.86. 
EXHIBIT D 
1337 East Yale Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106-1612 
November 19,1992 
Vaughn Christensen 
Applied Computer Techniques, Inc. 
772 East 3300 South 
Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Re: Wages Due 
Dear Vaughn: 
I had hoped to hear from you at mid-month to receive the commissions or gross pay due me for the 
period I worked for ACT from October 1 through October 14, 1992. I believe the terms of our Agreement 
(dated March 2, 1992) entitle me to be paid a minimum of $750.00 for that period, whether or not you 
ultimately obtained any commissionable sales from my prospective customers. The legal advice that I 
have received confirms this interpretation of the Agreement, and I had hoped that you too might have 
checked and discovered this to be the case. 
If you have had a chance to look into this issue, I would appreciate your forwarding that payment 
($750.00) to me within the week. If I receive it, I will consider myself to be paid in full for all claims that 
could exist between us; and I will wish you and Linda well in your business. 
I understand that your failure to pay me for that two-week period of work may violate both state and 
federal minimum wage laws. (The U. S. Department of Labor and the Utah Industrial Commission are 
charged with investigating such violations, and should be able to confirm this interpretation). 
My lawyer has advised me that Utah law required you to pay me within 24 hours of the end of my 
employment Given your failure to do so, despite my written request of October 15,1992, Utah law 
provides that the contractual wages continue from the date of my request until the wages are paid, for up 
to 60 days. (I enclose a copy of the relevant statute, U.C.A. 34-28-5). 
I do intend to insist upon your payment to me of the gross wages due me. If I am forced to file suit to do 
so, I will request not only the $750 wages for October 1 -14, but also the full amount due under the law 
(an additional $3000 for 60 days past October 14). I will also seek attorneys1 fees under U.C.A. 34-27-1. 
I hope you will be able to confirm with your legal counsel my right to receive gross pay of $750.00 under 
the Agreement, so that we may have an amicable conclusion of our business relationship. 
Sincerely, K ^ / 
Lee K. Shuster 
enc. 
fe. EXHIBIT E oppled computer technique/ 
772 East 3300 South 
Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
(801) 486-0073 
December 1.1992 
Lee K. Shuster 
1337 East Yale Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105-1612 
Dear Lee: 
According to paragraph 5D of your Employment Agreement dated March 2,1992, 
Applied Computer Techniques is obligated to pay commissions for sales received which 
are attributable to your efforts for a period of thirty days following your termination. This 
thirty-day period ended November 14, 1992. During this period, no additional sales were 
received. Hence, no additional commissions are due you. A concluding Draw and 
Commission Report is enclosed. 
In regard to the disputed payment of $750 for the period October 1 through 14,1 
have learned from the Industrial Commission that because your semimonthly checks were 
draws against future commissions when no commissions were earned, i am not obligated 
to advance you additional draws. However, according to the Commission, federal and 
state statutes require that i compensate you for your time at minimum wage for the period 
of October 1-14,1992. Accordingly, I have enclosed a check for 80 hours of pay at $4.25 
per hour, less applicable taxes. 
As I was preparing this check, a question arose concerning the $90.15 deduction 
taken from your checks for dependent insurance coverage. In researching the matter, I 
found that $631.05 had been deducted to date, but dependent premiums from 7/16/92 
through 10/15/92 were only $540.90. Hence, a reimbursement of $90.15 is included on 
the check. 
I hope that you will consider this an amicable conclusion of our business 
relationship. Linda and I both wish you well in your future business pursuits. 
Sincerely, 
~#att 
Vaugty* J Cbfnstensen 
President 
Enclosures 
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Thomas R. Blonquist, Esq., (0369) 
Attorney for Defendant 
40 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-0525 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTX, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
LEE K. SHUSTER, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
APPLIED COMPUTER ] 
TECHNIQUES, INC., 
Defendant, 
) ANSWER 
) Civil No. 920016945 CV 
) Judge Dennis M. Fuchs 
Answering the Complaint of Plaintiff, Defendant admits, denies 
and avers as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Avers that Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
1. Admits the allegations contained in paragraphs one, two, 
three, four, five and six. 
2. Denies each and every allegation contained in paragraph 
seven. 
3. Admits each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 
nine, ten, eleven and twelve. 
4. Denies each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 
thirteen, fourteen and Plaintiff incorporates by reference hereat 
its answers to paragraphs four through twelve incorporated by 
reference at paragraph fifteen. 
5. Admits the allegations contained in paragraph sixteen, 
seventeen and eighteen, 
6. Denies each and every allegation contained in paragraph 
nineteen and twenty. 
7. Defendant repeats, realleges and incorporates by 
reference hereat its answers to paragraphs four through twelve 
incorporated by reference at paragraphs twenty one and paragraph 
twenty two. 
8. Denies the allegations contained in paragraph twenty 
three. 
9. Defendant repeats, realleges and incorporates by 
reference hereat its answers to paragraphs four through twelve set 
forth at paragraph twenty four and paragraphs fifteen through 
nineteen set forth at paragraph twenty five. 
10. Admits that on or about December 12, 1992, Plaintiff made 
written demand for $7,750 in gross pay but denies that said wages 
were due Plaintiff under the employment agreement. 
11. Admits the allegations contained in paragraph twenty 
seven. 
12. Denies the allegations contained in paragraph twenty 
2 
eight• 
13. Denies each and every allegation of Plaintiff's Complaint 
not specifically admitted herein. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Avers that all suras owed by the Defendant to the Plaintiff 
under the Agreement between the parties and under Title 34 of the 
Utah Code Annotated have been paid by the Defendant in full. 
WHEREFORE, having fully answered Plaintiff's Complaint, 
Defendant demands that the same be dismissed and that he be awarded 
its costs incurred herein and such other and further relief as the 
Court deems just in the premises. 
DATED this / day of February, 1^93. 
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/ 
lomas R.^Hlonquist 
MAIpTNG CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to Linda Faye Smith, Esq., C/0 
University of Utah, College of Law, Salt Lake City, UT 84112 this 
day of February, 1993.
 y / ^  t 
Thomas/k. ^lonquist 
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LINDA FAYE SMITH, #44 60 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
C/O University of Utah 
College of Law 
Salt Lake City, UT 84112 
Telephone: 581-4077 
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CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
LEE K. SHUSTER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
APPLIED COMPUTER 
TECHNIQUES, INC. 
Defendant. 
* 
* 
AMDENDED I^EMORANDUM OF 
POINTS #ND AUTHORITIES 
IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
fOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 920016945 
Judge Dennis M. Fuchs 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
The material facts are undisputed: 
1. On or about February 26, 1992 plaintiff Mr. Shuster and Applied 
Computer Techniques, Inc. (hereinafter "ACT") entered into to an 
Employment Agreement attached as Exhibit A. (Complaint 1 4, admitted in 
Answer f l, Exhibit A to Complaint, copy also attached hereto as Exhibit 
A.) 
2. From February 26, 1992 to October 14, 1992 Mr. Shuster worked 
for ACT, "devoting all his time and energy during normal business hours" 
to ACT'S business. (Complaint 1 5, admitted in Answer 1 1, 
6S 
Agreement 1 4 .) 
3. From February 26, 1992 to September 30, 1992, ACT paid Mr. 
Shuster the "gross pay" provided for under Paragraph 6 of the Employment 
Agreement, since the commissions earned never exceeded such "gross pay." 
(Complaint 1 6, admitted in Answer 1 1) . 
4. The employment relationship ended on October 15, 1992, At that 
time Mr. Shuster made written demand to ACT for payment of wages for his 
work from October 1, 1992 through October 14, 1992. (Complaint 1 9, 
admitted in Answer 1 3, Exhibit B) . 
5. On October 19, 1992 ACT wrote Mr. Shuster and refused to pay any 
wages whatsoever for this two-week period, on the grounds that "no 
commissions were earned" during that period. (Complaint 1 10, admitted 
in Answer 1 3, Exhibit C) . 
6. On November 19, 1992, Mr. Shuster again wrote and demanded the 
"gross pay" of $750 provided for in the Employment Agreement. Mr. Shuster 
further informed ACT that its failure to pay him any amount whatsoever 
not only violated the Agreement but violated state and federal minimum 
wage law. (Complaint 1 11, admitted in Answer 1 3. Exhibit D) 
7. On or about December 1, 1992 ACT paid Mr. Shuster gross pay of 
$340, representing minimum wage for 80 hours of work; but again failed 
and refused to pay the gross pay of $750 as demanded pursuant to the 
Employment Agreement. (Complaint 1 12, admitted in Answer 1 3, Exhibit 
E.) 
8. ACT failed and refused to pay Mr. Shuster any wages whatsoever 
for Mr. Shuster's last two week of work; and this failure continued for 
2 
approximately forty-five (45) days after the end of his employment and 
after his written demand for payment of wages, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 34-28-5 (Supp. 1992). (Complaint 1 18, admitted in Answer 1 5). 
9. Mr. Shuster made written demand for "gross pay" of $750 under 
the Agreement on or about November 19, 1992 which was more than 15 days 
before bringing this action on December 14, 1992. (Complaint i 26 & 27, 
admitted in Answer 1 10 & 11.) 
10. Mr. Shuster commenced this action on December 14, 1992 which 
is within 60 days of his separation from ACT'S employment. (Complaint 
as filed, Complaint 1 9 admitted in Answer 1 3). 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES OF LAW 
Plaintiff Lee Shuster is entitled to judgment as a matter of law for 
the wages owed him under the party's employment contract, for statutory 
civil penalties due to his former employer's failure to pay wages in a 
timely fashion, and for reasonable attorneys' fees to be taxed as 
statutory costs of this suit. 
I. THE PARTIES' EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT ENTITLES PLAINTIFF LEE SHUSTER TO 
THE CONTRACTUAL "GROSS PAY" OF $750 FOR HIS FINAL TWO WEEKS OF WORK. 
The employee Mr. Shuster was and is entitled, under the Employment 
Agreement, to wages of $750 for his final two weeks of work. 
The interpretation of the Employment Agreement is a matter of law. 
Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co. 749 P.2d 581, 582 
(Utah, 1988) . This contract is not ambiguous. Faulkner v. Farnsworth 665 
3 
P. 2d 1292, 1293 (Utah, 1983) (whether the contract is ambiguous and 
requires parol evidence to understand is itself a question of law). This 
Court should interpret the terms of this contract "according to their 
plain and ordinary meaning." Equitable Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross 
849 P. 2d 1187, 1192 (Utah. App., 1993). 
Paragraph 5 of the Agreement sets forth a compensation structure 
involving "commissions" to be based upon the employee's sales of goods. 
Paragraph 6 sets forth provisions for paying a "draw against future 
commissions" (also called "gross pay"). Following 91 days of employment, 
that amount of gross pay is $1500 per month. (1 6) , There is no 
contingency or ambiguity regarding the Employer's obligation to pay the 
employee, at a minimum, this gross pay each pay period. And until the 
final pay period, ACT did always pay this "gross pay." (Statement of 
Material Facts 1 3, above.) 
In two circumstances the Agreement does cap the amount of commissions 
the employee can earn based upon the outstanding "draw." Paragraph 6 
provides that in any month in which commissions earned exceed $2500 and 
a "draw balance" exists, "the excess [commissions] over $2500 shall be 
used to recover any outstanding draws previously paid to the Employee." 
Paragraph 5D addresses what occurs when the employment relationship ends: 
the employee is entitled to commissions for 30 days "following 
termination. . . less any outstanding draws." The only provision dealing 
with the termination of employment gives the employer greater rights to 
recapture "draws" from "commissions." The contract does not begin to 
suggest that the employee is entitled to anything less than the 
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contractual "gross pay" for his last weeks on the job. 
The employer's initial interpretation1 of the contract--that Mr. 
Shuster was entitled to no wages whatsoever for his final two weeks of 
full-time labor for ACT--was, of course, illegal. The federal Fair Labor 
Standards Act, the Utah Minimum Wage Act and state regulation require 
employers to pay their employees at least minimum wage for their work. 
See 29 U.S.C.A. § 206; Utah Code Ann. § 34-40-101 et. seq. ; and Utah Reg. 
572-1-3. See also Pierce v. Anagnostakis 394 P.2d 74, 75-76 (Utah, 1964) 
(waitress's agreement to work for only tips did not bar suit under Utah 
statute for minimum wage). 
The employer's interpretation(s)2 of this contract are also 
unconscionable. ACT'S interpretation(s) would make the wages owed an 
employee entirely dependent upon the date when employment ended. If the 
employee resigned the day after "payday," he might be fully compensated. 
If, as in this case, the employment terminated the day the pay period 
ended, the employer would have obtained two weeks of free (or "half-
priced") labor. Surely that cannot be the meaning of any employment 
contract which can be terminated with no notice. (Agreement 1 13) 
This contract should not be considered ambiguous simply because the 
defendant "ascribes a different meaning to it to suit his or her own 
interests." Equitable Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross 849 P. 2d 1187, 
1
 See Exhibit C, Letter from ACT. 
2
 ACT's ultimate payment of minimum wage may indicate that ACT's 
current position is that the contract requires the payment of 
minimum wage. 
5 
1192 (Utah. App., 1993) citing Larson v. Overland Thrift and Loan 818 P. 
2d 1316, 1319 (Utah App. 1991) cert, denied, 832 P.2d 476 (Utah, 1992). 
The only plain, sensible and legal interpretation of the contract that 
ACT drafted and Mr. Shuster signed is that Mr. Shuster is entitled to the 
"gross pay" amount (here $750) for his last two weeks in ACT's employ. 
II. ACT'S FAILURE TO PAY ANY WAGES FOR OVER 45 DAYS AFTER MR. SHUSTER'S 
EMPLOYMENT HAD CEASED VIOLATED STATE STATUTE AND ACT MUST PAY THE 
STATUTORY CIVIL PENALTY. 
The defendant ACT has admitted that it failed to pay any wages at 
all to Mr. Shuster for 45 days, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5.3 
It is similarly undisputed that Mr. Shuster gave written demand for his 
wages on the day his employment ended, and that he filed this action 
within 60 days of that date.4 
The Utah Payment of Wages Act (UPWA) requires that an employer 
promptly pay an employee final wages5 after the employment relationship 
ends. Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5.6 "If the employer fails to do so upon 
3
 See Statement of Material Facts 1 8 above, relying upon 
Complaint 1 18 admitted in Answer 1 5. 
4
 See Statement of Material Facts 1 8 and 10 above. 
3
 Although the Employment Agreement speaks of "commissions", 
as well as "gross pay," the statute defines the term "wages" to 
include "commissions." Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-2. 
6
 The time periods vary slightly depending upon whether the 
employer "separates" an employee from the payroll (24 hours) or the 
employee "resigns" (72 hours). In this case, these differences are 
irrelevant, since ACT failed to pay any wages for 45 days, violating 
the statute irrespective of which subsection applies. The statutory 
6 
the employee's written demand for payment, the employee's wages continue 
to accrue from the date of written demand until payment is made, but no 
longer than sixty days." Smith v. Batchelor 832 P. 2d 467, 469 (Utah, 
1992)(dicta). 
The statute provides that the "wages of the employee shall continue• 
• at the same rate which the employee received at the time of 
separation." Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5(2) (emphasis added) . The statutory 
word "shall" indicates that this is a mandatory penalty. Indeed, the trial 
court in Smith v. Batchelor saw this penalty as mandatory.7 
Irrespective of whether Mr. Shuster was owed the contractual wage 
(See Point I) or minimum wage, ACT violated the UWPA by failing to pay 
any wages to Mr. Shuster within the statutory time period. The only issue 
for this Court to determine is which wage rate--and thus which penalty-
applies. If this Court finds that Mr. Shuster was owed $1500 per month 
under the Agreement, then the penalty must be ordered for the statutory 
period of 60 days, or for $3000. If this Court determines that Mr. Shuster 
was owed only minimum wage for his final two weeks of work for ACT, then 
exception for certain "sales agent[s] employed on a commission 
basis" does not apply here because Mr. Shuster did not have "custody 
of accounts" and the net amount due him was not determined "only 
after an audit or verification of sales, accounts, funds or stocks." 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5 (1)(b). See Complaint 1 16 & 17 admitted 
in Answer 1 5. 
7
 In Smith v. Batchelor, the trial court denied recovery under 
the federal Fair Labor Standard's Act given the recovery awarded 
under the UWPA. The Supreme Court reversed: "The trial court found. 
. . that equity prohibits both state and federal recovery for the 
same violation. This is incorrect. Equity follows the law. It 
cannot abridge an explicit statutory requirement." Smith v. 
Batchelor at 471. 
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this Court must award his $1021 as the mandatory penalty at that minimum 
wage for the 45 days Mr. Shuster received no payment at all. 
III. IF THIS COURT FINDS MR. SHUSTER ENTITLED TO WAGES UNDER THE 
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT, THIS COURT MUST ALSO ORDER REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' 
FEES. 
The Employment Agreement provided for "gross pay11 of $750 per pay 
period, and Mr. Shuster has been paid only $340 for the final two-week 
period. (See Point I, supra.) If this Court holds that Mr. Shuster is 
entitled to wages under the Agreement, this Court should also award 
reasonable attorney's fees. 
Utah statute provides for attorneys fees in suits for wages. Utah 
Code Ann. § 34-27-1. Three criteria must be met: there must have been 
a written demand for wages "at least 15 days before suit." There has been 
here. (See Statement of Fact 1 9) . The demand must "not exceed the amount 
so due.n Mr. Shuster's claim has consistently been that wages of $750 were 
owed. If this Court finds "that the amount for which he has brought suit 
is justly due" then: 
"it shall be the duty of the court. . . to allow to the plaintiff 
a reasonable attorneys' fee in addition to the amount found due for 
wages, to be taxed as costs of suit." Utah Code Ann. § 34-27-1. 
Here again, this statute uses mandatory, not discretionary language. 
The possibility of some confusion between "commissions" and "gross pay" 
should not preclude recovery under this section. See Bennett v. 
Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc. 417 P.2d 761, 765 (Utah, 1966) (salesman 
awarded attorneys' fees for commissions he had demanded.) Also see Pierce 
8 
v. Anagnostakis 394 P.2d 74, 75-76 (Utah, 1964) (attorney's fees not 
awarded because waitress had demanded more than court awarded, but minimum 
wage ordered despite evidence waitress agreed to "tips only" to defraud 
IRS) The public policy behind enforcement of wage laws supports the award 
of attorneys' fees even if they are large in comparison with the wages 
recovered: 
As a general rule, the amounts recoverable under the FLSA and the 
UPWA are so small that attorney fees will exceed any potential 
recovery. Hence, unless an award of attorney fees is available, 
workers would be unable to enforce their rights under these 
statutes. Smith v. Batchelor 832 P.2d at 474 (J. Stewart, concurring 
and dissenting). 
Calculation of attorneys' fees is in the sound discretion of the 
trial court. Jenkins v. Bailey 676 P.2d 391, 393 (Utah, 1984). An award 
of attorneys' fees must be supported by evidence in the record. See 
Cabrera v. Cottrell 694 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah, 1985). Here Mr. Shuster 
submits and relies upon the Affidavit of Counsel Linda Faye Smith. 
The factors which should be considered include: "the efficiency of 
the attorneys in presenting the case"s (here, without any unnecessary 
discovery, this Court may dispose of this case entirely on the pleadings) ; 
"the reasonableness of the number of hours"9 (the Affidavit sets forth 
the time and tasks) ; "the expertise and experience"10 (the Affidavit sets 
forth counsel's background); the "necessity of bringing a law suit to 
8
 See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken 764 P.2d 985, 989 (Utah App., 
1988) quoting Cabrera at 622. 
9
 Id. 
10
 Id. 
9 
vindicate the rights under the contract"11 (this seems clear from the case 
itself). 
The Utah Court of Appeals in the leading Dixie State Bank v. Bracken 
case has stated that "as a practical matter" in awarding reasonable 
attorneys' fees this Court should answer the following four questions: 
"1. What legal work was actually performed?"12 
Here there has been legal research on the issues of contract law, and 
federal and state wage law; drafting of pleadings; and drafting the Motion 
and Memorandum for Summary Judgment. 
"2. How much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to 
adequately prosecute the matter?" 
All of the work was reasonably necessary. No unnecessary discovery or 
investigation had taken place. 
"3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates 
customarily charged in the locality for similar services?" 
Counsel bills at a modest rate of $80.00 in the unusual event that she 
is engaged in private practice for a fee. Counsel believes it is 
reasonable in this case to award attorneys' fees for all hours spent at 
rate of $60. This is a rate consistent with that of a first-year 
associate, and is appropriate given the difficulty of the case and that 
counsel needed to become familiar with certain local rules and procedures. 
11
 See Dixie Bank at 989 quoting Trayner v. Cushing 688 P.2d 856 
(Utah# 1984). 
12
 Id. at 990. The following numbered quotes 2 - 4 are also 
found therein. 
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"4. Are there circumstances which require the consideration of 
additional factors? . . . ." 
The additional factors which merit some consideration are 1) the fact that 
the ad damnum in this case is low as compared with the attorneys' fees 
sought and 2) the policy reason that supports the award of attorneys' fees 
under this statute in order to ensure employers pay the wages owed to 
their employees. The Court of Appeals has stated: 
Although the amount in controversy can be a factor in determining 
a reasonable fee, care should be used in putting much reliance on 
this factor. It is a simple fact in a lawyer's life that it takes 
about the same amount of time to collect a note in the amount of 
$1000 as it takes to collect a note for $100,000." Dixie State Bank 
at 990. 
In Dixie State Bank the Court of Appeals determined attorneys' fees of 
$4847.50 to be reasonable based upon the attorney's billing rate of $75 
per hour and the fact that the attorney had done no unnecessary work. This 
recovery was permitted even though the principal amount on the note to 
be collected was only $7695. 
Here counsel has similarly not spent unnecessary time pursuing 
nonmeritorious claims and has not engaged in unnecessary discovery. The 
hours spent have been the minimum amount of time counsel believed 
necessary to competently present the legal arguments to this Court to 
resolve the matter entirely by Summary Judgment. As Justice Stewart 
recognized, "attorney fees will exceed any potential recovery" in many 
wage claim cases. Smith v. Batchelor at 474 (J. Stewart concurring and 
dissenting) Accordingly, this Court should award attorneys fees for all 
time reasonably spent (28.5 hours) at a reasonable rate ($60 per hour) 
11 
even though that amount ($1710) exceeds the wages recovered. This is 
proper under the wage statutes to enforce the important policy goals of 
ensuring that employers pay the workers who depend upon them. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Plaintiff Mr. Lee Shuster 
requests this Court enter Judgment for him in accordance with the 
Complaint for unpaid wages of $410, civil penalties under the Utah Wage 
Payment Act of $3000 (or of $1020 if only minimum wage was owed) , 
attorneys' fees of $1710 and costs of $51.07. 
DATED this 25th day of October, 1993. 
LINDA FAYE SMITH 
Linda Faye Smi^h (Bar No. 44 60) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Lee K. Shuster 
c/o University of Utah 
College of Law 
Salt Lake City, UT 84112 
(801)581-4077 
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Thomas R. Blonquist, Esq., (0369) 
Attorney for Defendant 
40 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-0525 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
LEE K. SHUSTER, 
Plaintiff, ] 
v. 
APPLIED COMPUTER ] 
TECHNIQUES, INC., 
Defendant. 
) DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOHON FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT and 
AMENDED MEMORANDUM OF 
) POINTS ANja^AUTHORITIES IN 
SUPPORT ^ HEREOF 
Civil Jfo. 920016945CV 
Judtje Dennis M. Fuchs 
Responding to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and his 
amended memorandum of points and authorities in support thereof, 
Defendant submits the following: 
FACT$ 
The facts material to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment 
are as follows: 
1. Defendant is in the business of selling computer hardware 
and accounting software to beer, wine, soda and bottled water 
distributors throughout the United States. 
2. 80% of Defendant's revenues come from new sales and 20% 
from revenues received from existing customers. 
3. Defendant is only able to stay in business by seeking out 
and selling its products to new customers. 
4. On March 2, 1992, Defendant hired Plaintiff as a 
commissioned salesman to call on potential new customers and 
attempt to sell Defendant's products to them. 
5. At the time the Plaintiff was hired, Defendant's sales 
staff comprised two outside salesmen. 
6. By agreement, Plaintiff received commissions in the 
amount of 20% of the gross profit on each sale made by Plaintiff to 
a new customer. 
7. Also by agreement, Plaintiff received a draw or prepaid 
commissions based upon the length of time of his employment. 
8. At the time Plaintiff terminated his employment, he was 
receiving prepaid commissions at the rate of $1,500 per month. 
9. During the period of Plaintiff's employment with the 
Defendant, 8 1/2 months, he earned commissions of $1,831.30 but 
received advanced commissions of $11,632.86. 
10. From October 1, 1992 to October 14, 1992, Plaintiff made 
no sales and, therefore, earned no commission. 
11. During the thirty (30) days following Plaintiff's 
termination of employment, none of his prospects purchased products 
from the Defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: PLAINTIFF WAS EMPLOYED AS A COMMISSIONED SALESMAN. 
Defendant is in the business of selling computer hardware and 
2 
accounting software and the life blood of its business is seeking 
out new customers and selling them Defendant's products. This is 
so because 80% of the Defendant's revenues come from new sales and 
20% come from existing customers. 
The Defendant hired two outside salesmen, the Plaintiff being 
one of them, to solicit new sales, i.e., make telephone contacts 
travel to the business locations of potential customers, 
demonstrate Defendant's products and attempt to convince said 
potential customers that it would be to their advantage to buy 
computer hardware and software from the Defendant. Because large 
revenues are made by the Defendant at the time of the sale of 
products to a new customer, all outside salesmen receive, as 
commission, 20% of the gross profit of each sale they close. 
All sales persons employed by the Defendant since it began 
doing business in 1978 have been employed on a commissions basis. 
In the instant case, Plaintiff signed an agreement that clearly 
spelled out that he was to be paid a commission based upon his 
sales of Defendant^ goods and services. 
The basis of Plaintiff's compensation is set forth in the 
agreement* between the parties at: 
1. The opening paragraph of paragraph 5. 
2. Paragraph 5A which states "the commission rate shall be11. 
* The agreement is attached hereto and the areas referred to 
have been highlighted in yellow. 
3 
3. The "charge backs" paragraph at page 2 talks about when 
a sale is "commissionable". 
4. The example paragraph on page 3 refers to a "commission" 
and explains how the amount of commission is calculated. 
5. Paragraph 5A 2) defines which goods and services are 
"commissionable". 
6. Paragraph 5A 2)(c) defines what the commission percentage 
will be. 
7. Paragraph 5A 3) defines the commission to be received 
when a sale is made to a customer who buys multiple systems. 
8. Paragraph 5B defines when commissions are payable. 
9. Paragraph 5C requires the Defendant to provide Plaintiff 
with the computation showing how the amount Plaintiff's commission 
was determined. 
10. Paragraph 5D provides that the employee is entitled to a 
commission for any sales that occur within thirty (30) days after 
termination, if the Plaintiff was working with the purchasing 
customer. 
11. Paragraph 6 defines the schedule for prepayment of 
commissions. 
POINT II: A COMMISSSIONED SALESMAN CANNOT RECEIVE PREPAID 
COMMISSIONS UPON TERMINATION. 
Because Plaintiff was a salesman paid on a commissions basis# 
who made no sales between October 1 and October 14, 1992 and 
4 
voluntarily terminated on October 14, 1992, he is not entitled to 
receive additional prepayment of future commissions. Upon 
termination, the salesman no longer calls on potential customers, 
therefore, there is no way he can earn commissions. When the 
salesman has no potential to earn future commissions he is not 
entitled to receive nor is his employer obligated to pay him any 
prepayment of future commissions* There is nothing in the 
employment agreement that gives Plaintiff that right nor is there 
a business practice that justifies such a policy. 
The Plaintiff terminated his employment on October 14, 1992. 
No prospective, with whom he had been dealing, bought products from 
the Defendant during the period October 1 - 1 4 , 1992, nor during 
the thirty (30) day period that followed. Therefore, there is 
nothing owed to the Plaintiff on this account. 
After being advised that commissioned salesman were entitled 
to receive minimum wage, the Defendant paid Plaintiff for 80 hours 
work at the minimum wage, minus applicable taxes. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is the position of the Defendant 
that there is nothing owed to the Plaintiff as a result of his 
employment with the Defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant respectfully requests 
that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be denied and that the 
5 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment filed 
granted. jh/ 
herewith be 
DATED this A day of November, 1993. _ 
//^Thomas/R. l^onquist 
MAILING CERTIFIC 
I hereby certify that on this A k^ day of November, 1993, I 
mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
to: 
Linda Faye Smith 
Attorney at Law 
c/o University of Utah 
College of Law 
Salt Lake City, UT 84112 
6 
TabF 
Thomas R. Blonquist, Esq., (0369) 
Attorney for Defendant 
40 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-0525 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
LEE K. SHUSTER, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
APPLIED COMPUTER 
TECHNIQUES, INC., 
Defendant. 
) AFFIDAVIT 
Civil No. 920016945CV 
Judge Dennis M. Fuchs 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Vaughn Christensen, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. At all times material to matters pending in the above 
entitled matter, affiant was the president and chief executive 
officer of the Defendant* 
2. In said position, affiant has access to all of 
Defendant's business records. 
3. Among said business records, are the records showing 
sales made and commissions earned by Plaintiff as well as all 
advanced commissions paid to the Plaintiff. 
4. Said records show that during his employment with the 
Defendant, Plaintiff earned commissions of $1,831.30 and was paid 
advanced commissions of $11,632.86. 
5. The business records of Defendant further show that no 
sales were made during the period of October 1, through October 14, 
1992, therefore, no commissions were earned by the Plaintiff during 
the period. 
6. After Plaintiff terminated his employment, affiant was 
informed by the Industrial Commission of Utah that Plaintiff was 
entitled to minimum wage for the period October 1, through October 
14, 1992, even though he was paid on a commission basis. 
7. As a result, on December 1, 1992 Defendant sent Plaintiff 
a check for 80 hours of work at $4.25 an hour, less applicable 
taxes. 
8. During the thirty (30) days following Plaintiff's 
termination of employment, none of his customers purchased products 
from the Defendant. 
9. Further affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this /¥ day of November, 1993. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /a day of November, 
Vaughn yChr istensen 
^ 3 ^ / j ^ ^ 
1 9 9 3 . 
NOTABYHJBUC ] 
Shtrte* tamiMki 
40 Sou* #00 Cut 
S«!tUJc»Cftr,Uttl S4102 
My Commnttow Enpif— 
M«r is. \m 
8TATE OF UTAH 
C7 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake County 
TabG 
LINDA FAYE SMITH, #4460 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
C/O University of Utah 
College of Law 
Salt Lake City, UT 84112 
Telephone: 581-4077 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
LEE K. SHUSTER, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
APPLIED COMPUTER 
TECHNIQUES, INC. 
Defendant 
* 
* 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND MEMORAfii&UM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CiviA No. 920016945 
Jvjflge Dennis M. Fuchs 
MATERIAL FACTS -- ADMITTED AND DISPUTED 
Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities sets forth 
numbered paragraphs (10) of undisputed material facts, with references 
to the record (pleadings, exhibits, contract). Defendant ACT does not 
identify any of these facts as disputed.1 The Plaintiff's Statement of 
1
 Defendant ACT does set forth "facts" it deems "material," but 
none appear to specifically controvert Plaintiff's Statement of 
Material Fact. 
/oe> 
Material Facts should be deemed admitted by this Court.2 
Defendant ACT has also filed a cross Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Plaintiff Lee Shuster disputes certain of the facts set forth as 
"material" in ACT'S Response and Memorandum. However, Plaintiff Shuster 
does not believe that any of the facts he disputes are material to the 
issues presented in his Motion for Summary Judgment. In response to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff submits his Affidavit 
and notes he disputes the following: 
1. Plaintiff disputes Fact \2 and 13 regarding the source of ACT's 
revenues as contrary to the information he was given during his 
employment and unsupported by the record. (See Affidavit of Lee Shuster 
110.) 
2. Plaintiff agrees that Fact 1l describes ACT's business, but 
disputes that he was employed to sell "Defendant's products" as stated 
in Fact 14. Plaintiff Lee Shuster was employed only to sell the 
accounting software to bottled water distributors, ACT having limited 
his duties in accordance with the Employment Agreement 1 1. (See Shuster 
Affidavit 14) . 
3. Plaintiff disputes that he was hired "as a commissioned 
salesman" (Fact 14) and that ACT's staff comprised "two outside 
salesmen" (Fact 15) . The Employment Agreement sets forth the nature of 
2
 Rule 4-501(2) (b) of the Code of Judicial Administration 
provides: "All material facts set forth in the movant's statement 
and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall 
be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless 
specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement." 
(emphasis added) 
2 
the employment relationship, and its interpretation is a matter of law. 
(See Agreement Exhibit A) . There is no support in the record for 
characterizing Mr. Shuster as an "outside salesman" and none is cited. 
Mr. Shuster worked at ACT'S offices under ACT'S direction during his 
employment. (Shuster Affidavit 1 6-9, 12). 
4. ACT's Facts \S - \S state that "by agreement" plaintiff received 
"commissions" a "draw" or "prepaid commissions", but ACT does not 
reference the written Employment Agreement. Plaintiff would dispute that 
there was any "agreement" beyond the written Employment Agreement. The 
interpretation of the Employment Agreement is a matter of law (not 
fact). (See Employment Agreement, Exhibit A.) 
5. Plaintiff would dispute the figures set forth for the 
"commissions earned" and "advanced commissions" (Facts \9) if these 
amounts were material. (Shuster Affidavit 1 11 and Attachment #2). 
6. Plaintiff would dispute the statement that "plaintiff terminated 
his employment" (Facts 18) if it were material. Plaintiff contends that 
ACT terminated the Employment Agreement (as provided for in the 
Agreement 1 13) on October 14, 1992. ACT offered plaintiff Lee Shuster 
a new contract that would have involved working for commissions only, 
which plaintiff declined. (See Shuster Affidavit 1 5 and correspondence 
Exhibit B and Affidavit Attachment #2.) 
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
I. THE FACTS IN DISPUTE ARE NOT MATERIAL TO THE LEGAL QUESTION 
IN COUNT I REGARDING THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
The defendant ACT describes a company whose "life blood" is new sales 
and contends that a salesman who has failed to make sales shouldn't be 
paid. Mr. Shuster's Affidavit and letter (Attachment #2) to Vaughn 
Christensen, president of ACT, provides a different, complex picture of 
the product, pricing, and seasonal sales patterns of ACT. However, it 
is not necessary for this Court to decide if ACT's sales-force was 
incompetent or if ACT's accounting software for the bottled water 
distribution industry was poorly conceived, overpriced and only 
marginally marketable. The only question for this Court is what the 
Employment Agreement means. 
II. THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT IS UNAMBIGUOUS, AND AS A MATTER OF LAW 
ENTITLES MR. SHUSTER TO OUTSTANDING GROSS PAY AS PRAYED FOR IN 
COUNT I OF THE COMPLAINT 
The Employment Agreement itself is admitted to by both parties. If 
it is unambiguous (which the Plaintiff believes it is), the Court may 
enter judgment as a matter of law.3 Faulkner v. Farnsworth 665 P.2d 
1292, 1293 (Utah, 1983). 
Defendant ACT seeks to characterize any and all payments to be made 
3
 If the contract is ambiguous, then this Court should deny 
summary judgment and await a trial where parol evidence can be 
considered in understanding it. 
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to Mr, Shuster as "commissions" or "prepaid commissions" dependent upon 
sales. Nevertheless, the Agreement unambiguously provides a schedule of 
guaranteed monthly payments: 
"If commissions earned do not equal the draw per month as outlined 
above, Employer shall add that amount necessary to cause Employee's 
gross pay to equal the monthly amount shown, such amount to be 
considered a draw against future commissions. " Employment Agreement 
5 6, Exhibit A (emphasis added). 
While the Employer can recapture the "draw" in certain circumstances, 
the Agreement never permits the employer to pay the employee less that 
the defined "gross pay." When commissions earned rise above a certain 
level ($2500 per month) the Employer is permitted to recapture the 
"draw." (Employment Agreement 16) After termination, the Employer is 
entitled to recapture any "commissions" earned during the 30 days 
following termination to repay any outstanding draws which may exist. 
(Employment Agreement 15.D.) But there is no provision for paying the 
employee less than the "draw" or "gross pay" provided for on the 
schedule. The Agreement never sets forth an exception to the Employer's 
obligation to pay this monthly amount. 
Defendant ACT argues that it is illogical to require ACT to make 
"prepayment of future commissions" upon a salesman's termination, since 
"there is no way he can earn future commissions." Memorandum p.5. But 
this is incorrect. The Agreement allows the salesman to receive 
commissions on sales made for 30 days after he ceases to be employed. 
(Employment Agreement 1 5.D). So a "prepayment" of future commissions 
which might be earned on sales during the month following termination is 
5 
perfectly logical; and it is required under this Agreement. 
Not only is this the only logical, plain and unambiguous 
interpretation of the contract--it is the only interpretation that would 
render the contract legal. If an employer pays nothing to an employee 
who worked full-time, at the employer's offices under the employer's 
direction for two weeks, simply because the employee sold none of the 
employer's $4000 accounting packages during that two weeks; the Employer 
will violate state and federal minimum wage law. See 29 U.S.C.A. §201 
et. seg. (Fair Labor Standards Act) and Utah Code Ann. §34-40-101 et. 
seg. (Utah Minimum Wage Act). Contrary to ACT'S arguments, Mr. Shuster 
is entitled to be paid for his two weeks of work. 
ACT'S Memorandum refers to Mr. Shuster as one of two "outside 
salesmen" but makes no reference to anything in the record to support 
this characterization.4 There is no support in the record or elsewhere 
to characterize Mr. Shuster (or the other salesman) as an "outside 
salesman." Federal law, which exempts "outside salesmen" from minimum 
wage law, defines an "outside salesman" as an employee "who is 
customarily and regularly engaged away from his employer's place or 
places of business. ..." 29 C.F.R. §541.5(a). The federal regulatory 
interpretations (Part B) state: 
"This requirement is based on the obvious connotation of the word 
'outside' in the term 'outside salesman.' It would obviously lie 
beyond the scope of the Administrator's authority that "outside 
salesman" should be construed to include inside salesmen. . . .29 
4
 Both federal and state law exempt an "outside salesman" from 
the minimum wage law. See 29 U.S.C.A. §213 and Utah Code Ann. §34-
40-104. 
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C.F.R. §541.502(a)" 
"Characteristically the outside salesman is one who makes his sales 
at his customer's place of business. This is the reverse of sales 
made by mail or telephone. . . ."29 C.F.R. §541.502(b) 
Mr. Shuster worked full-time, every week, for ACT at ACT's place of 
business, 772 East 330 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. Not only was he 
regularly present, but he was required to be present at the employer's 
place of business during normal business hours. He called customers by 
telephone, demonstrated products via modem, mailed solicitations and 
developed marketing plans all at ACT's business offices. (Shuster 
Affidavit 1 6-9, 12 and Attachment #2.) The unsupported 
mischaracterization of Mr. Shuster as an "outside salesman" should not 
be permitted to confuse the issue. 
The plain meaning--and the only legal interpretation--of the 
Employment Agreement is that ACT was required to and failed to pay Mr. 
Shuster the "gross pay" for his full-time work during his final two 
weeks of employment at ACT. 
III. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR CIVIL PENALTIES UNDER THE UTAH PAYMENT OF 
WAGE ACT IS NOT DISPUTED. 
Plaintiff's second cause of action is based upon ACT's violation of 
the Utah Payment of Wages Act. The UPWA requires prompt payment of wages 
at termination. This cause of action does not depend upon the 
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interpretation of the Employment Agreement.5 If ACT owed Mr. Shuster 
any wages at all (even "minimum wages") ACT violated the UPWA for paying 
nothing for 45 days. 
Defendant ACT'S Response and Memorandum does not controvert this 
point at all. Accordingly, this Court should order judgment for the 
Plaintiff under Count II for ACT'S violation of the Utah Payment of Wage 
Act. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and set forth more fully in the 
Amended Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff Lee Shuster requests this Court 
to enter Judgment for him on all counts in accordance with the Complaint 
and his Motion for Summary Judgment. 
LINDA FAYE SMITH 
&-jinda Faye 'Sm^ fch (Bar No. 4460) 
Attorney ror Plaintiff 
Lee K. Shuster 
c/o University of Utah 
College of Law 
Salt Lake City, UT 84112 
Telephone: (801) 581-4077 
5
 The amount of the civil penalty depends upon whether this 
Court finds the plaintiff entitled to wages under the Agreement or 
entitled to minimum wage. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
and Affidavit of Plaintiff Lee Shuster (together with Attachments #1 and 
#2) were mailed, postage prepaid, on this 1st day of December, 1993, to: 
Thomas R. Blonguist (0369) 
Attorney for Defendant 
40 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
iiida Faye Sofft. 
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LINDA FAYE SMITH, #4460 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
C/O University of Utah 
College of Law 
Salt Lake City, UT 84112 
Telephone: 581-4077 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
LEE K. SHUSTER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
APPLIED COMPUTER 
TECHNIQUES, INC. 
Defendant. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
PLAINTIFF 
LEE K. SHUSJTER 
Civil No. 920016945 
Judgs Dennis M. Fuchs 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Lee K. Shuster, being first duly sworn on oath, hereby state as 
follows: 
1. I am the plaintiff in the above-named case. 
2. Prior to my employment at ACT I had been employed as a sales 
person in the computer industry for over 5 years, earning between 
$35,000 and $50,000 annually. 
3. I was employed by ACT from on or about March 2, 1992 until 
October 15, 1992 in accordance with the Employment Agreement attached to 
the Complaint, No separate or different agreement existed between myself 
and ACT. 
4. I was employed solely to market ACT'S accounting software (and 
related hardware) to bottled water distributors. Although ACT sold 
other products and services to new and existing customers, my sales 
responsibilities were limited by ACT to marketing the accounting 
software packages to bottled water distributors in certain geographical 
areas. 
5. My employment at ACT ended when Mr. Christensen, ACT'S 
president, informed me that ACT was revoking the existing Employment 
Agreement. ACT's President, Mr. Christensen, offered me a new agreement 
which I understood to involve working for "straight commissions." I 
declined this offer as set forth in my letters. (See Exhibits B and 
Attachment #2.) 
6. During my employment I worked on a full-time basis at ACT's 
offices at 772 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, UT 84106. I was 
required, by the terms of my employment and by ACT's president Vaughn 
Christensen, to be present at ACT's offices during normal business 
hours; and I was not permitted to work at my home or elsewhere except as 
specifically approved by Mr. Christensen. 
7. I can recall only three occasions when I did leave ACT's 
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offices on business: once to call upon a local customer, once to 
complete some promotional materials on my computer at home, and during 
the final two weeks of my employment to accompany Mr. Christensen to a 
trade show in Cincinnati, Ohio. 
8. The sales solicitation work I performed for ACT was at Mr. 
Christensen's direction and in accordance with Mr. Christensen's 
marketing scheme, and included primarily telephone solicitation and 
selling. 
9. In addition to the sales solicitation work, I performed other 
services to improve ACT'S ability to market its accounting software to 
bottled water distributors. Certain of the other services I performed 
for ACT are discussed in my letter to ACT, attached here as Attachment 
#2. During my employment my co-salesman and I undertook a comprehensive 
analysis of ACT'S sales and marketing strategies, pricing, and 
prospects. This analysis had been requested by Mr. Christensen, as 
mentioned in the final paragraph of his Memorandum attached hereto as 
Attachment #1. The initial analysis of ACT'S product and marketing 
strategy is also contained in my Letter to Mr. Christensen dated October 
14, 1992 and attached hereto as Attachment #2. This letter is a true 
and accurate statement of my activities and my observations. 
10. My understanding of ACT'S revenues and expenses, based upon 
Mr. Christensen's statements to me, is contained in my letter, 
Attachment #2, page 5. On information and belief I dispute that ACT 
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received 80% of its income from new sales. However, I do not think this 
is relevant to my claim for unpaid wages. 
11. My objections to ACT'S accounting of "my" sales and 
"commissions11 is set forth on page 6 of the letter Attachment #2. On 
information and belief, ACT made sales to customers in the territory ACT 
had assigned to me pursuant to the Agreement. ACT did not refer these 
customers to me and ACT gave me no credit for such sales. I believe 
these actions were in violation of the Employment Agreement. However, 
this dispute makes no difference in this case for unpaid wages. 
12. During the last two weeks I worked for ACT (October 1 to 
October 15), I worked more than full-time, and well over 80 hours. 
During most of that period I worked at ACT'S offices conducting 
telephone solicitation. However, at ACT'S direction I also accompanied 
Mr. Christensen and the other salesman, Gene Castle, to Cincinnati, Ohio 
to a trade show of bottled water distributors. This involved being away 
from home for approximately three days, including Friday evening, all 
day Saturday and Saturday evening, and returning to Salt Lake City on a 
Sunday. During this period I prepared for this trade show, met 
prospects at the show, and followed up prospective sales after the show. 
During this time I also learned that a prospective customer had selected 
a competing product, based solely upon lower cost and faster 
installation and training. (See letter Attachment #2, p. 3). In 
addition, in consultation with my fellow salesman I completed a draft 
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analysis of ACT's marketing of its accounting software to the bottled 
water distribution industry. This analysis is contained in my letter of 
October 14, 1992, Attachment #2. This summarizes the work I did for ACT 
during my final two weeks of employment for which ACT originally paid me 
nothing, and now has paid me only minimum wage for 80 hours of work. 
DATED this 1st day of December, 1993 
k//^ A qW k^ > 4^ 
Lee K. Shuster 
The foregoing Affidavit was subscribed and sworn before me on this 
1st day of December, 1993. 
Notary Public 
My Commissions Expires: I / @ 5 5 ^ tU^ffOf^^^^ 
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ATTACHMENT #1 
MEMORANDUM 
To: Lee Shuster 
Froa: Vaughn Christensen 
Date: October 14, 1992 
Subject: Eaployaent Agreeaent 
Lee, Gene wrote ae a letter today regarding our conversations last 
Wednesday and Thursday, As Gene is still unsure of the changes Linda and I 
are taking to the agreement, I thought a aeao to you clearly explaining these 
changes would be in order. Thus, the following is a recap of the conversation 
on October 7f 1992, between you, Linda, and ae regarding the changes to your 
Eaployaent Agreement, which we feel are necessary due to your inadequate sales 
results to date: 
1. Draw cap. The provisions in paragraph 6 for issuing you draws 
against future coaaissions earned will be modified such that the maximum 
aaount issued to you in the fori of draws against future coaaissions will be 
established at $13,000.00. If the rate of sales has not substantially changed 
by November 15, 1992, we should Beet again to determine what other peasures we 
can eaploy to correct this situation. 
2. Recovery of outstanding draws. The provisions in paragraph 6 for 
recovering the outstanding draw balance will be •odified such that earned 
coaaissions which exceed $750.00 in any semimonthly pay period will be applied 
as a credit to the outstanding draw balance, thus reducing it. 
3. The above changes will becoie effective Wednesday, October 7, 1992. 
Thus, it was our intention to teninate the Eaployaent Agreement as it existed 
on October 7, and execute a new one incorporating the above changes as of that 
saae date. As Linda was unable to sake the changes prior to her departure for 
Berauda, I will take the changes and incorporate thea into a new agreeeent 
which will go into effect today, October 14. 
Further, I suggested that you spend soae tiae contemplating the 
potential sales in the bottled water aarket, our sales and aarketing strategy, 
pricing, etc., with the goal of suggesting ways in which this undesirable 
condition of inadequate sales aay be rectified. I asked you to get back with 
Linda and ae at your convenience, but no later than Wednesday, October 14, 
with your suggestions. If needed you could discuss these issues with Gene. I 
await your input. 
ATTACHMENT #2 
1337 East Yale Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105-1612 
October 14, 1992 
Dear Vaughn: 
I am writing this to confirm your actions of last week, and to respond to your request that I 
propose a "counter-offer11 or give you my suggestions about your business and my relationship with it 
First, during meetings on Wednesday and again on Thursday, you informed me that as of 
November 15, 1992, Applied Computer Techniques was terminating the Employment Agreement (dated 
March 2, 1992) with me. (See paragraph 13). You further offered to re-employ me, effective November 
15, 1992, provided that I would agree to a major change in my compensation. Basically, you informed 
me that you would no longer guarantee a gross pay of $1500 per month, as Paragraph 6 of the 
Employment Agreement does. Rather, you would pay me additional monies only after and if I made new 
commissionable sales. 
You also gave me a Draw and Commission Report which indicated the following regarding my 
81/2 months of employment (as of November 15, 1992): 
ACT Gross Income from my sales (est) $12,208.00 
ACT Gross Profit from my Sales $9,156.00 
(after 25% "costs" subtracted) 
Compensation paid to me $13,464.16 
"Loss" you calculate from my employment $(4307.91) 
Commissions (@20% of Gross Profits) $1,831.30 
You explained that under the proposed new arrangement, after I made a new sale I would be 
entitled to commission at the existing rate (20%) up to $1500.00 per month, but that any commission 
over $1500.00 per month would be retained by ACT to repay the "draw" I have received. (In the existing 
contract, commissions are recaptured by ACT only when they exceed $2500.00 per month.) You further 
explained that after I had made sales, earned commissions, and paid some of the draw back to ACT, I 
would again be entitled to "draw" on future commissions, but a permanent cap on draw of $13,464.16 
(the total amount paid to me as of November 15) would be placed on any amount advanced to me in 
this way. In the short run, I could expect to receive payments only when and to the extent I earned 
commissions. 
You also took the same steps (terminating the Employment Agreement and offering this new 
agreement) with the other salesman ACT employs, Gene Castle. In neither instance did you indicate 
that we salesmen had failed to carry out our obligations under the contract in a competent manner, (nor 
had you previously so indicated). You did not offer any new benefit to us in consideration for the 
financial sacrifice you are asking us to make. In fact, your offer to "re-employ" us indicated that you 
believe we are competent sales people, and you told Gene and me that we were the best sales people 
you have ever had. Rather, your stated concern was that ACTs expenses were too high in light of its 
income, and your desire was to cut the expense of paying the personnel that perform sales work or to 
"motivate" higher sales by the new straight commission compensation arrangement. 
Let me explain how this situation appears from my perspective, and why your offer to re-
employ me is unrealistic and unreasonable. In summary, the commissions I would likely earn (given an 
unchanged product mix, pricing structure and marketing strategy, and in light of ACTs sales history) total 
between $5000 and $10,000 annually. It does not seem a reasonable or suitable plan for my 
dependents or me to pursue a chance of earning between $2.50 per hour and minimum wage, as is the 
most likely scenario if I remain at ACT. 
Let me explain how I have come to these conclusions. First when I was a candidate for this 
job in November and December, 1991, I asked you about the sales prospects, the company's history, 
and my potential earnings. As I told you, I had earned between $35,000 and $65,000 annually 
(averaging $49,000) over the past 4 years as a salesperson in the computer industry and I would require 
such earnings to meet child support obligations, debt obligations, relocation expenses and to provide for 
basic living expenses. You assured me that it was quite possible for me to realize earnings in that 
range. I asked about the company's sales history, and learned that I would need to sell five to six times 
as many systems as the prior salesmen for my previous average earnings to be matched. You indicated 
that the prior salesperson was not making enough telephone contacts, and you explained that such 
increase in sales and earnings was possible by making more contacts each day and because the 
market for your product was expanding. You also told me you had purchased a data base of prospective 
customers, which would make telephone sales a viable approach. As you know, I accepted a position 
with your firm (leaving a job whose base salary was $35,000 guaranteed, plus 40% commissions on all 
products sold nationally) in order to relocate to Utah for personal reasons. I hoped your predictions about 
your business and its prospects were accurate. 
Now that I have been employed by ACT for seven months, I am in a better position to analyze 
your marketing needs and your business's prospects. 
It now appears that during the first 24 months (October 1989 to October 1991) after introducing 
the product ACT sold approximately 30 units. This averages 15 units per year. You told me that the 
average new sale grossed $5000 for ACT, so 15 units per year would yield ACT $75,000 in income. If I 
have correctly understood this history it seems that sales over the last 12 months (September 1991 to 
September 1992) are consistent with historical patterns, with approximately 15 units sold, despite a 33% 
increase in the cost of the standard system during this past year. The conclusion I draw from this 
analysis is: despite the fact that Gene and I have followed your instructions for calling dozens of 
prospects each day, overall sales have not increased, but are in fact on track with respect to historical 
performance of the product My conclusion is that the market for this product is more of a factor in 
determining sales potential than strictly increasing the number of calls made per month in sales 
prospecting activities. 
If this historical pattern continues unaltered (as it appears it will), the commissions available 
for new sales will be approximately $15,000.00 per year. (If this is divided between two salespeople, it 
will be $7,500 per year for each.) It is your belief that we can influence customers to buy our product by 
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following the "procedure/needs/criteria" selling method, and doing so with large numbers of prospects 
You hired two salesmen (instead of one) thinking that twice as much telephoning would result in three to 
four times as many sales. To date, this has not been the result. 
Unfortunately, the economics of the market are more complicated Basic marketplace 
economics teaches that as a products price is increased, fewer purchases will be made. There is an 
ideal price for a product which will maximize income I am not clear how you have determined the 
pricing of our products to new customers (particularly how you determined that a 33% increase in entry 
level pricing during this year was prudent.) However, I know that our product's comparatively high pnce 
substantially reduces the number of potential customers who are willing and able to buy our product 
The current targeted market (Route-based bottled water distributors) is a narrowly defined 
niche. The largest segment of the market are distributors owned by producer/bottlers; and typically they 
have previously obtained accounting packages from their corporate MIS departments. So, without a 
vastly different approach and product, they are rarely prospects. The other companies that distnbute 
bottled water are small to medium-sized companies. 
The small companies often are "one-person" operations. They are not computerized, consider 
the purchase of a computer a major expenditure, and are shocked with the S4000.00 pnce for accounting 
software plus an additional $1500.00 for training. They will not purchase our product until they are 
convinced of the value of a computer, assisted to fully utilize the computer in their business (e.g. word 
processing as well as accounting and route management), and then will only buy an accounting system 
such as ours if they have the money and it is cost effective given the size of their business. Thus far, we 
have not tried to offer a "full-service" computer consulting business to introduce these customers to cost-
effective benefit of computerized accounting and route management functions. Without such an approach, 
these companies are not realistic prospects. 
Then there are the medium-sized distributers who usually have computerized. Many already 
have accounting packages. Some use "off-the-shelf1 general accounting or spreadsheet products 
available for as little as $50.00. While ours is more industry-specific and does include route management 
functions, our product can be 100 times more expensive, and many of these potential customers are not 
convinced that the greater efficiency we offer them will translate into savings, while others simply do not 
have the capital to purchase our package, even when they are convinced of the potential savings and want 
to purchase our product 
Finally, there are a very few firms who have sufficient capital and appreciation for a fully 
automated accounting and route management system. But they are also doing their homework and 
looking closely at our competition. Mountain Valley Water, of Miami, Florida was such a potential 
customer. Yet at the last moment Robert Levin, a very respected and influential leader in the bottled 
water industry, decided to purchase a package from one of our competitors. Although our prices were the 
same (after our $1590 "free" software promotion), Mr. Levin openly told me our competitor was willing to 
train his people on-site at no additional cost In contrast your policy is to charge the customer the cost of 
your wife's travel and per diem expenses to Florida and $200 per day for training, (or under my contract I 
could take the cost of air travel and living expenses out of my $750.00 commissions.) Basically, 
purchasing our competitor's product saved this customer about $1500.00 - our product cost about 38% 
more than our competitor's did. Moreover, our competitor was willing to install the system immediately, 
where our policy is to tell the customer it will take one or two months to arrange installation and a training 
visit by your wife. Furthermore, Mr. Levin told me "Lee, you conducted the product demonstrations in a 
highly professional manner and answered all my questions about the product and services in a way that 
directly showed me how your product would meet my needs." In a nutshell, Mr. Levin went elsewhere 
based on the higher start-up cost, not my role in the direct selling process. 
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Accordingly, even the prospects who are very motivated to buy, may choose to buy from a 
competitor because the package we offer costs more for what the customer gets. Similarly, there are 
customers wno are willing and able to spend significant sums for accounting software, but who have 
requested design differences from our package. These requests have included (but are not limited too): 
Assets and Depreciation module, Work Order/Service module. Manufacturing modules, and Telemarketing 
module. (My potential customers whose needs we could not accommodate included Vermont Hidden 
Spring, Serve-A-Care, K and K Water, and of course the entire Culhgan Treatment and Conditioning family 
of companies.) if we will not accommodate these desires as oroauct enhancements at a reasonable price 
and time frame, the customer will (and does) simply go elsewhere. 
This has been a rather extended way of saying that sales are not directly, proportionally or linearly 
related to time and effort spent selling over the telephone. From having spoken to hundreds of potential 
customers, it is my impression that our product will only appeal to a certain niche segment of the route-
based, bottled water industry. It would seemingly make sense for ACT to have a business plan that 
accurately defines and describes that "target market" If ACT were to perform such analysis, you may be 
able to establish a coherent plan to increase sales and/or profitability. I am firmly convinced that your 
present approach of requiring a high volume of calls and of paying the sales force a straight commission to 
"incent" more sales will have no positive effect upon sales. 
A marketing director would certainly study the prospect database ACT has at hand, and which our 
contract requires you to furnish. (Para. 12.) As you know, that data base had 1200 prospects in my territory, 
all of whom had been contacted by mid-August However, over 50% of that database were not prospective 
customers (because they were out-of-business, branch offices, etc). This leaves 600 to 800 prospects per 
sales person to now re-contact. Since I averaged 25 calls a day, I could re-contact all the customers on this 
list once every six weeks to see if they were now interested in our product Despite repeated requests from 
Gene and me, you have not provided additional, updated marketing resources in this area. (Commercially 
available lists, based on U.S. and Canadian listings of S.I.C Code 5499-03; Bottled and Bulk Water 
companies equal 4000 listings; with another 4000 listings for Office Coffee Service companies. 
A marketing director would also study the competitive products in the market, and assess our 
product (as to characteristics, price, etc.) in light of its competition. Since you have been selling this 
product for three years (and I have been with ACT for seven months), I expected that you would be able to 
inform me of the unique qualities of our product in comparison with our competition. Nevertheless, most of 
the information on file about our competition has been acquired during the past months through my 
voluntary efforts. 
A marketing director would also analyze the sales history of the company. It appears that there 
were few (3) sales in the first year of operation, and then a flurry of sales clustered in September 1990 -
January 1991. The same level of sales did not occur from September 1991 - January 1992. What was 
conducive to these sales in autumn of 1990 and has not been as conducive since? It could be our change 
in pricing. It could be a competitor's reduction of price. It could be a national economic downturn. It could 
be that the market is saturated. It could be that customer lists were fresh two years ago, and are played out 
now. In the fast-paced computer industry, it could be the recent availability of low-cost, off-the-shelf, 
simple-to-use accounting packages coupled with the drastic reduction in the price of hardware. Since I had 
not been asked to analyze this phenomenon until last week, I relied upon your analysis and complied with 
your strategy of high- volume "telsell" calling. I do not know how ACT operated in fall, 1990 (e.g. price and 
training costs, customer lists, method of contact, advertising), but it would be wise to ask what is different 
today. Moreover, ACT should carefully survey and analyze the reasons prospects have given for not being 
interested in our product ACT needs to understand the reasons for sales currently being lost to 
competitors. A statistical analysis of the market using our own data would assist ACT to better target 
customers and perhaps redesign or repackage the product and services sold. 
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A marketing director should also study the reasons why many of our customers prefer not to buy 
computer hardware from us along with the software package (whether they already own a computer or can 
simply acquire one more cheaply than at our prices). ACT should also study the profitability of "add-on" 
sales or consulting services to existing customers, compared with new sales to new customers. Presently, 
there is little or no concerted effort (or marketing focus) to promote sales and the high cost effectiveness of 
additions (e.g. handheld terminals) to current customers. Moreover, the fact that the salesman may receive 
NO commission for such sales discourages the development of this highly profitable market. 
Gene Castle and I have been instructed to make a large volume of calls to prospective 
customers, to avoid the issue of price, and to convince the customers that our product is "better." We have 
not been previously asked to perform a market analysis and we have not been provided with the relevant 
data to do so. Nevertheless, we have suggested new marketing ideas. And our ideas have generally been 
met with resistance or rejection. Gene studied the sales history, and learned that ACT has rarely sold a 
new system during the summer months. (It is the busy season for the bottled water industry.) With this 
information Gene and I designed a "summer special" where a "free computer or software" was sold with the 
accounting package and delivery and payment were deferred until fall. As a result, ACT enjoyed significant 
(5 or 6 units) "summer sales." We also got free public relations coverage from Mountain Valley Water, a 
major nationwide distributor of bottled water. However, this marketing approach was financed by Gene and 
me - the "free computer" was paid for out of our commissions. 
I have personally tried to expand and diversify our sales approach by loaning ACT three modems 
for conducting long-distance telephone-based product demonstrations and avoiding expensive travel to 
prospect sites. Gene and I designed a demoguide booklet to assist in the demonstration process. We 
saved the company time and money by making available a complete desktop publishing system including: 
computer scanner, clip art and graphics software, fonts and high-quality graphic laser printing producing an 
innovative marketing mailer for promoting hand-held sales. When you said you could not afford a 
commercial spreadsheet program for faster preparations of proposals and cost justification studies, I gladly 
donated a registerable copy of a leading spreadsheet program. All these efforts seem to have been 
unrecognized. 
Frankly, it appears that ACT has been pursuing the same sales approach for some time, with the 
same pricing structure (albeit having increased entry-level prices 33% this past year). If ACT continues the 
same marketing patterns, it is likely to get the same sales results. ACT needs to analyze the facts and to 
creatively consider a variety of new and innovative ways to service the industry if its profits and growth rate 
are to increase. 
Of course, ACTs fiscal analysis should encompass more than the market for increasing new 
sales. It should also consider ACTs costs and better ways to be more cost effective. You have told me that 
ACTs gross income for the past three years has been approximately: $200,000 in 1989, $225,000 for 1990, 
and $310,000 for 1991. If I have understood these figures accurately, it seems that the majority of ACTs 
earnings have not been from new sales, but from sales to existing customers (annual support fees, income 
from the sales of accounting forms, custom programming, sales of add-on peripherals and network 
components). Thus, ACTs gross income from new sales over this period (approximately $160,000) has 
represented less than 30% of ACTs total income. While new sales may be necessary to support future 
growth, it does not appear that new sales of the current product have ever been the major source of income 
for ACT. It also appears that the new sales-to-date in 1992 are entirely consistent with the sales record in 
prior years at this point of the year, as I believe you said earnings were only down 3% over last year. 
Although I certainly cannot make sense of everything you told us in this regard, you clearly 
informed Gene and me that the changes in the contract were necessitated by a budget crisis. You explained 
that it cost you almost $16,000.00 per month "just to keep the doors open," that you and your wife Linda had 
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not paid yourselves but $1500.00 salary all year, and that you only had a bit over $100 00 in your personal 
checking account Surely, if sales to new customers were your only income, you would be in debt well over 
$100,000 for 1992 alone. If circumstances are actually that desperate, perhaps a major scale-back is in 
order: a return to the mom-and-pop style operation, with you and your wife doing all sales and marketing, 
technical support, business and financial planning, and secretarial support; and hiring the needed 
programming staff on a contracted basis On the other hand, it seems that if your gross sales this yeai are 
similar to your gross sales last year ($300,000), having expenses of $16,000 per month ($192,000/year) will 
still leave a net profit of $108,000. Similarly, I must wonder about your decision to recently hire a secretary at 
an annual salary of nearly $20,000 while you are laying off salesmen who work for as little as $18,000 I also 
question the wisdom under such financial conditions of spending several thousand dollars recently to attend 
an industry trade show that yielded, very few, if any new qualified prospects Finally, I wonder why you are 
focusing upon cutting expenses at a time when your time might be more productively spent helping Gene 
close an historic sale. 
As you know, Gene's soon-to-be-accomplished sale in Chicago is a unique and very desirable 
customer. That customer is a very large distributor (probably one of the largest independent distributors in 
the nation) who has focused on down-sizing their route management and accounting system and is seeking 
to change to a networked PC-based system with hand-held terminals. Accordingly, our largest competitor 
(who sells similar accounting packages for mainframes, not PC-based networks) was not an issue. Because 
of the prospects size, the price of our system is not a disadvantage And the customer will be buying not only 
our software, but also additional high-margin products (hand-helds) and services (custom programming). If 
Gene succeeds in landing this sale, its size and profitability will be of historical dimension for ACT, possibly 
grossing more in one sale than all of fiscal year-1990 earnings Therefore, I am baffled that contract 
termination and lay-offs are the topic of the week, rather than a company-wide celebration for Gene's (and 
the entire ACT team's) truly amazing accomplishment 
I find myself wondering if your desire to terminate Gene's and my contracts in the autumn (when 
sales historically pick up) isn't part of a disturbing pattern. I have been told that all prior sales people have 
worked less than a year and have left in the autumn. After they are gone, you close any sales that may be 
pending. Since salesmen are not entitled to any commissions for sales made more than 30 days after the 
end of their employment, you need not pay them anything further for the contacts they had made. Being 
understaffed every fall when sales pick up may be a good way to save paying both draw and commissions to 
the sales force. 
Another questionable practice is your failure to provide new salespeople with all appropriate "client 
and prospective client information" (Para. 12. A) in the "designated geographical area" (Para. 3. A.) you have 
assigned to that salesperson. For example, there were three sales made in my territory during my 
employment at ACT to clients I had no knowledge or information about I believe that under the Agreement 
those clients should have been referred to me so that I could have had or shared responsibility for those sales 
and for follow-up sales to this "existing customer." 
In conclusion, you should understand that I will consider myself to have been laid off by ACT for 
purely economic reasons as of November 15, 1992. For the reasons set forth above, I do not believe that I 
can accept your new offer of providing me the opportunity to work for whatever commissions I may earn after 
that date, since the likelihood is that I will earn less than minimum wage under that scenario. I do believe 
you need to hire or contract with a marketing director and/or small business financial planner. I would be 
willing to discuss or undertake a market analysis of ACT on a short-term, independent contract. 
• Pagtf of 7• 
Since I have based my decision on the facts as I understand them (and as I have set forth above), 
please let me know whether I have misunderstood any facts I would appreciate a prompt, written response 
Sincerely, 
Lee K. Shuster 
Account Representative 
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doors open. For example, you saw our affidavit showing 
that he'd received $11,000 in advance commissions. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. BLONQUIST: And he's earned commissions of a 
thousand. 
THE COURT: I saw that. 
MR. BLONQUIST: And you just can't stay in 
business under those terms and conditions. And so what we 
did was suggest that these, that there be a change and as 
a result of that, this man terminated, and our position is 
that when he terminated, then his advance against 
commissions terminated and we don't owe him anything 
further as an advance. 
In answer to the Court's question, the question 
then arose, do we owe him for the period of time that he 
did work even though he didn't make any sales? And the 
Industrial Commission advised my clients — I wasn't 
involved at the time — that even though there was an 
agreement and even though it provides commissions, if the 
man did work for you, you'll owe him minimum wage. So we 
paid him the minimum wage for the two-week period minus 
the taxes, and as far as we were concerned, that should 
have resolved the matter. But their position is, of 
course, that that isn't the case. 
THE COURT: How do you get around the penalty 
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though, even if you say it should be minimum wage, how do 
you get around the penalty that it wasn't paid on time 
according to the statutes? 
MR. BLONQUIST: Well --
THE COURT: Why isn't there a penalty there? 
MR. BLONQUIST: Well, all we can say is 
ignorance in the law is no excuse, Your Honor, but as soon 
as we were told by the Industrial Commission that that was 
the case, we paid it. Now if you want to slap our hands 
for that, hey, we didn't do it right, but we certainly did 
take care of the matter as promptly as we were advised by 
the commission and actually informed as to the status, the 
position that the Industrial Commission took in those 
matters, but prior to that time my client didn't know. 
THE COURT: Okay, that helps me better 
understand your position. Okay thank you. 
Did you find something? 
MS. SMITH: Well, no, I don't find it in the 
statute, but I did bring a complimentary -- courtesy copy 
to The Court of the Smith v. Batchelor case which is --
THE COURT: I'm looking at the — 
MR. BLONQUIST: -- which is a, a case that the 
Supreme Court decided just a couple of years ago and it 
was filed in the District Court — 
THE COURT: Do you think I can read this without 
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regard to subsection D or 5D; or whether the Court feels 
that plaintiff really has shown, based on the affidavits 
and the motion and the memorandum, grounds for summary-
judgment . 
In regard -- I have to be honest with you -- in 
regard to who was bad in the company and whose fault it 
was, I'm not sure that that has any bearing on the Court's 
decision whatsoever. The question is an employment 
contract that existed between the parties. Some bearing 
may be whether defendant quit or was forced to resign 
based on all of the sudden a unilateral changing of 
employment contract from gross sales, you know, subject to 
commission versus straight commission, depending on the 
affidavits. Obviously that seems to be a point of 
dispute. I'm not sure that that's a point here that the 
Court has to consider. 
What I want to do is go back over the employment 
contract, go back over this, make sure that I do feel that 
I have jurisdiction in the matter. If anybody else — if 
either of you can find anything that either says 
positively I do or I don't, I'd be interested in that, and 
give you ten days to provide that to the Court. But other 
than that, I want to go back over it and make a 
determination as to whether the Court, you know, it's 
almost my opinion that partial summary judgment can be 
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granted, although I'm not doing that, I'm just trying to 
give you an idea of where I am, and it would be a question 
of whether the Court feels that a partial summary judgment 
should be based on minimum wage or should be based on the 
guaranteed gross income as per the contract. 
I'm a little hesitant to say that this court can 
find that the employee -- or the employer had no 
responsibility to pay and acted in good faith. There was 
nothing in 3428 or section 34 that appears to me as if 
good faith has anything to do with the penalties. It's 
just, really it gets paid or it doesn't get paid and these 
are the penalties that are imposed if it isn't paid. 
MR. BLONQUIST: I understand that, Your Honor, 
and I was being very candid with the Court in answering 
your question. 
THE COURT: YES. 
MR. BLONQUIST: Those are the facts. 
THE COURT: So the biggest question in the 
Court's mind is maybe an interpretation of the contract in 
looking at what figure the Court should be looking at. 
MR. BLONQUIST: And our position is as I stated 
that we think it's the minimum wage, and we paid, we paid 
late, and if we're entitled to be penalized, so be it. 
THE COURT: I understand that. The other issue 
would be the Court will reserve the issue of attorney's 
22 
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CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
LEE SHUSTER, ) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, ) 
) Case No. 920016945 CV 
VS. ) 
) Judge Dennis M. Fuchs 
APPLIED COMPUTER TECHNIQUES, ) 
INC., ) 
Defendant. ) 
This matter having come before the Court on both 
Plaintiff's and Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment and the 
Court having heard arguments and reviewed the memorandums as 
submitted hereby: 
A) Denies Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
B) Grants Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment for the 
following reasons: 
1. There was a valid contract between the parties. 
2. The contract called for wages to be paid to 
Plaintiff in the amount of $1,500 per month. 
3. That at the time Plaintiff terminated his 
employment he was due wages as per the contract. 
4. That Section D of the employment contract would 
only apply if commissions were due and owing. 
5. That Defendant wrote the contract and therefore is 
bound by its terms and its interpretation. 
6. That Plaintiff did not pay the wages due Defendant 
upon termination. 
7. That Plaintiff is entitled to a penalty of 60 days 
wages as per the statute. 
8. That Plaintiff is entitled to the contract amount 
and not minimum wage. 
Therefore the Court grants judgment in the amount of $410.00 
prayed for in the complaint and the penalty of $3,000.00 as 
prayed for in the complaint and attorneys fees as provided in the 
statute. Plaintiff is awarded attorney fees as prayed for by the 
affidavit. Defendant shall have 10 days to challenge the 
attorney fees and request a hearing if appropriate. Plaintiff is 
to submit a judgment for the Court's signature. 
Dated this _// day of February, 1994. 
-2M-? 
•ire'MrFuchs 
Circui t Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a copy of the above Memorandum 
Decision on this l£th day of February, 1994, to: 
THOMAS R. BLONQUIST LINDA FAYE SMITH 
40 South 600 East C/O UNIVERSITY OF UTAH 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 COLLEGE OF LAW 
Salt Lake City, UT 84112 
Deputy Cle w 
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T LAKE DEPARTMENT 
LEE K. SHUSTER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
APPLIED COMPUTER 
TECHNIQUES, INC. 
Defendant 
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FINDINGS Of*' FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civj4 No. 920016945 
vPUdge 1.1e 1111 ,ii*i M , I«" u (• h s 
The above-captioned matter came for hearing on both the 
Plaintiff's and the Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment on 
February 2nd, iyiM, i in1 Honor dole Dennis M Kuclis presiding. The 
parties having filed motions and affidavits, and the court having 
reviewed the files and pleadings contained therein and having 
heard oral argumen 1 1 o w i  LK.|[ 3 rind i nl ei s i I 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
These material facts have ^ r been contested by 
and are undisputed, 
findings: 
1. The parti es entered into a valid contract for employment 
defendant ACT 
e fo.11 owing 
1 
on or about February 26, 1992, a copy of which is attached to the 
Complaint as Exhibit A. 
2. From February 26, 1992 to October 14, 1992 the plaintiff 
Mr. Shuster worked for the defendant ACT, "devoting all his time and 
energy during normal business hours" to ACT'S business. 
3. From February 26, 1992 to September 30, 1992, ACT paid Mr. 
Shuster the "gross pay" provided for under Paragraph 6 of the 
Employment Agreement, since the commissions earned never exceeded 
such "gross pay." 
4. The employment relationship ended on October 15, 1992. At 
that time Mr. Shuster made written demand to ACT for payment of 
wages for his work from October 1, 1992 through October 14, 1992. 
5. On October 19, 1992 ACT wrote Mr. Shuster and refused to 
pay any wages whatsoever for this two-week period, on the grounds 
that "no commissions were earned" during that period. ACT paid no 
wages at all at that time for that two-week period of work. 
6. On November 19, 1992, Mr. Shuster again wrote and demanded 
the "gross pay" of $750 provided for in the Employment Agreement. 
Mr. Shuster further informed ACT that its failure to pay him any 
amount whatsoever not only violated the Agreement but violated state 
and federal minimum wage law. 
7. On or about December 1, 1992 ACT paid Mr. Shuster gross pay 
of $340, representing minimum wage for 80 hours of work; but again 
2 
failed and ret use. i I | iy \ he full gross pay totalling $750 as 
demanded in accordance with the Employment Agreement. 
8 Mr Shuster made written demand for "gross pay" of $750 
under the Agreement on or about' November ' '* • ' "',"l-»« wh i rh wa a; more 
than 15 days before bringing this action on December 14, 1992. 
9 r commenced this action on December 1 4, l 992 
which is within 60 days of his separation finni An M «\mp] uyment. 
CONCLUSION- u* LAW 
1, The interpretation of the contract betweei :i defendant 
employer ACT and plaintiff employee Mr. Shuster is a matter of law. 
2, The h'mploymenl ALjieeoient "ii nmpil»iqiH >us. In paragraph 6 
it calls tor wages to be paid to Mr. Shuster r^e minimum amount 
o f C« 3 5 0 0 gr oss pay per month. 
3, At the time Mi , Shustei ' s (.nip] * -yitw.. n t - ndod „ed 
to wages due under the Employment Agreement, paragrapi w .. . wo 
week? or $750 gross pa% Paragraph - limited ACT's 
obligation pay commission- in, employment 
ended; alter ACT's obligation ;jv wages as per 
Fa rag 
4.. Mr. Shuster is today entitled in '!' I 11) waypw i aider t lie 
contract. 
5 Mr. Shuster the wages due and owing 
3 
upon termination, Mr. Shuster is entitled to a penalty of 60 days 
wages under the Utah Payment of Wages Act (Utah Code Ann. 34-28-5) 
of $3000. 
6. Mr. Shuster made a written demand for wages at least 15 
days before bringing this action and the demand did not exceed the 
amount justly due; but ACT did not pay Mr. Shuster the wages due 
him. Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 34-27-1 Mr. Shuster 
is entitled to reasonable attorneys fees for prosecuting this 
action. 
7. It is reasonable, in light of the time, effort, difficulty, 
and other relevant factors to award Mr. Shuster attorneys fees and 
costs as requested in his attorneys' affidavit of $1761.07. 
Therefore the Court grants judgment in the amount of $410 
prayed for in the complaint and the penalty of $3000 as prayed for 
in the complaint and the attorneys' fees as provided for in the 
statute. Plaintiff is awarded attorney fees of $1761.07 as prayed 
for by the affidavit. /^V'^^^'J/'X y/ 
Dated: ^ / W / 2 / 'frf 'M^^f^^f 
DeQnig.^'lfMch^,' 
Ci rcu iV Ctfui't 
4 
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JUDGMENT 
Ciy^l No. 920016945 CV 
vtfudge Denni s M, F'ichs 
Tl li s acti on came before the Court, Honorable Dennis ;-•: - ,:::s, 
Circuit Judge, presiding, * Plaintiff's 
Motions for Summary J^udgment pursuant ,.;.*.:- ^ . -. ::>f 
Civil Procedure, ru; eason that there are no disputed issues 
of material fact and - >. ;f f ia nut it led fn .Judgment as a matter 
of law on all counts, 
II is ordered and adjudged: 
That Plaintiff, Lee Shuster recover of i he - dant Applied 
Computer Techniques, im of $5171, 07 ,  (representing 
1 
$410.00 for contract damages, $3000.00 for civil penalties and the 
sum of $1761.07 for attorneys' fees and costs) with interest 
thereon at the rate of.-£*% as provided by law. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, UT, this 3 ' dhdate of 
March, 1994. 
.... „ JSafrfr 
Dennis 4p. FuchsT Cicruit Court Judge 
Vcvv. 
Clerk of Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Judgment were mailed, postage prepaid, on this th day 
of March, 1994, to: 
Linda Faye Smith (4460) Thomas R. Blonquist (0369) 
Attorney for Plaintiff Attorney for Defendant 
c/o University of Utah 40 South 600 East 
College of Law Salt Lake City; UT 84102 
Salt Lake City, UT 84112 
Clerk 
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